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ABSTRACT 
A listed company must publish a profit warning if its profit or financial position differs 
substantially from its expected profit or financial position. I examine how seasonal affective 
disorder (SAD) affects investors’ response to profit warnings. SAD is a medical condition 
that is characterized by a depressed mood during times when the amount of daylight is low.  
The first part of the research examines abnormal returns caused by profit warnings. I find 
evidence that both positive and negative profit warnings generate significant abnormal 
returns on the announcement day. Moreover, investors have more difficulties to evaluate 
negative profit warnings than positive profit warnings. The results imply that the size, MB 
ratio, or analyst recommendations do not affect investors’ response. However, I find 
differences in how investors respond to positive or negative profit warnings. Specifically, the 
risk of the company affects immediate response to negative profit warnings whereas the 
number of previous profit warnings affects post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD) of 
positive profit warnings. 
As the main interest of this thesis, I find that SAD affects investors’ response to profit 
warnings. The immediate response to positive profit warnings is lower during the SAD 
season, which supports the hypothesis about heightened risk aversion. Moreover, the PEAD 
of negative profit warnings is higher during the SAD season, which also supports the SAD 
hypothesis. My results imply that these effects are mainly driven by the fall. Interestingly, I 
find that SAD does not affect the immediate response to negative profit warnings or PEAD 
of positive profit warnings. I suggest that these two findings are explained by the ostrich 
effect and negativity bias, respectively. 
KEYWORDS: Profit Warning, Seasonal Affective Disorder, Behavioral Finance, Post-
earnings-announcement drift 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A listed company must publish a profit warning if its profit or financial position differs 
substantially from the expected profit or financial position of the company. This ensures that 
investors are aware of all relevant information about the company and can make rational 
investment decisions. (Karjalainen, Laurila & Parkkonen 2008: 153–154.) The new 
information generated by the profit warning should reflect into the prices immediately and 
correctly to state that markets are efficient (Fama 1970).  
Essentially, the market value of a share is affected by its expected return, which is estimated 
by various asset pricing models. The models, however, contain a lot of assumptions and 
estimating the correct return is difficult. The expected return can be used to calculate the 
abnormal return, which can be used to examine the market efficiency. If the markets are 
efficient, no significant abnormal returns should be observed. 
However, several studies (see for example Jackson & Madura 2003a; Jackson & Madura 
2003b; Bulkey & Herrarias 2005; Tucker 2007; Cox, Dayanandan & Donker 2017) show that 
abnormal returns are still observed several days after the profit warning. This thesis finds 
similar results, even though they are not as strong; abnormal returns are still observed two 
days after negative profit warnings. Overall, according to the efficient market hypothesis, 
this should not be possible. 
The main interest of this thesis is to examine whether seasonal affective disorder (SAD) 
affects the market response to profit warnings. SAD is a medical condition that is 
characterized by a depressed mood during times when the amount of daylight is low (Molin, 
Mellerup, Bolwig, Scheike & Dam (1996); Young Meaden, Forgg, Cherin & Eastman 
(1997). Symptoms of SAD involve, for example, social withdrawal, decreased activity, 
sadness, anxiety, and increased appetite (Partonen & Lönnqvist 1998). 
Because SAD causes heightened risk aversion during the fall and winter, the immediate 
market response to profit warnings should be lower during the SAD season. Depressed 
investors want to avoid risk, so they are more scared to trade with uncertain information. 
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However, even though the amount of daylight is low during the fall and winter, after the 
winter solstice, it starts to increase once again. On the other hand, after the summer solstice, 
the amount of daylight starts to decrease. Therefore, the post-earnings announcement drift 
(PEAD) should be higher during the SAD season, as investors start to see “light at the end of 
the tunnel.” These hypotheses are mainly supported by the findings of this study. 
As SAD is highly prevailing in Northern countries (Magnusson 2000), and Finnish listed 
companies seem to issue more profit warnings than other Northern countries (see Spohr 
2014), it is intriguing to study these two concepts together. As there is discussion and doubts 
of the idea that SAD would explain the patterns in stock markets, further studies are needed 
to fully understand whether SAD really affects the markets or not. Because of this reason, I 
offer another study to this discussion. To best of my knowledge, I am the first to document 
the impact of SAD on profit warnings. 
 
1.1. Profit Warning 
 
A profit warning is a listed company’s announcement that its earnings or financial position 
differs substantially from its expected earnings or financial position. A profit warning is not 
necessarily a negative thing: a profit warning can be positive or negative. A negative profit 
warning means that the expected earnings or financial position of the company is worse than 
anticipated. Conversely, a positive profit warning means that the expected earnings or 
financial position of the company is better than anticipated. A profit warning must be 
published promptly in a situation where new information becomes apparent and when this 
information has a significant impact on the price of the security. (Karjalainen et al. 2008: 
153–154.) 
The main difference between a profit warning and a normal quarterly released earnings report 
is that the profit warning is announced before the earnings report and the announcement 
occurs unexpectedly and irregularly. Profit warnings also provide more detailed information 
on the company’s success as well as reasons why the company is releasing the 
foreknowledge. The purpose of the profit warning is to reduce the information asymmetry 
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on the market and to ensure that investors have all relevant information in their possession. 
(Dayanandan et al. 2017.) 
Profit warnings often cause a large change in the value of a company’s share, from which 
both the managers and the owners would probably like to avoid. On the other hand, investors 
have an opportunity to generate quick profits if they succeed in defining the market reaction 
as unfounded. (Spohr 2014.) If SAD affects the market reaction, savvy investors could 
potentially use that information to generate quick profits. 
 
1.2. Purpose of the study 
 
The main purpose of this study is to examine whether seasonal affective disorder affects the 
market response to profit warnings using data from Finland during 2011–2017. The 
immediate reaction of the profit warnings is studied, but also PEAD is examined. Moreover, 
I also document whether the market response to profit warnings is delayed. Prior profit 
warning studies commonly examine only negative profit warnings, but I study positive profit 
warnings, too. This is to investigate whether the sign of the profit warning matters to SAD 
sufferers. 
I examine six hypotheses. The first three hypotheses are formed to investigate abnormal 
returns that profit warnings might cause. The remaining three hypotheses are the main 
interest of this thesis. Specifically, I examine how SAD affects investors’ response to 
negative and positive profit warnings. These hypotheses are explained in detail in chapter 
6.2. 
1.3. Intended contribution 
 
The possible effects of seasonal affective disorder to stock markets are still studied. Some 
researches criticize SAD (see for example Jacobsen & Marquering (2009)) while other 
researches strongly support the SAD hypothesis (see for example Kamstra, Kramer & Levi 
(2003)). I contribute to this debate studying the SAD effect on profit warnings in Finland. 
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Furthermore, to best of my knowledge, I am the first to document the impact of SAD on 
profit warnings. I also study the market response to both negative and positive profit warnings 
to contribute to the profit warning literature, as prior studies are generally focused only on 
negative profit warnings. Moreover, if SAD causes heightened risk aversion during the fall 
and winter, and the immediate reaction to profit warnings is lower during the SAD season, 
savvy investors may benefit from this and generate quick profits. This means that profit 
warnings announced during the SAD season have a smaller reaction than those announced in 
the spring and summer. This piece of information can be used to determine if the market 
response is justified or not. 
 
1.4. Structure of the thesis 
 
The remaining of the thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, actions, tasks, efficiency, 
asset pricing, and phenomena of financial markets are introduced. In Chapter 3, concepts of 
behavioral finance and seasonal affective disorder are carefully discussed. In Chapter 4, a 
listed company’s disclosure rules are explained. Chapter 5 has two main parts. First, the prior 
literature of profit warnings is reviewed, and second, the prior literature of the effects of 
seasonal affective disorder in stock markets is discussed. Chapter 6 introduces the data used 
in this study and the methodology. Chapter 7 showcases the results of the study. Finally, 
Chapter 8 offers conclusions, discussion, and provides thoughts about possible further 
studies. 
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2. FINANCIAL MARKETS 
 
The financial markets are traditionally divided into two sectors: the money market and the 
capital market. In the money market, market participants trade in the short term – in other 
words, with securities that have high liquidity, low risk and a maturity less than a year. 
Riskier securities with a maturity longer than a year are traded in the capital market. Financial 
instruments are generally more diverse in the capital market than in the money market. 
(Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2009: 23.) 
The financial markets have four key functions: 
1. To allocate funds as efficiently as possible between the surplus and the deficit sector. The 
financial markets are allocative efficient when investments in the surplus sector find their 
way into the deficit sector at the lowest possible cost and with little delay. 
2. Information transmission. When the markets are informatively efficient, investors are up-
to-date with the characteristics, return and risks of different investment objects. For example, 
companies must deliver their financial statements to the market on a regular basis. Therefore, 
a company cannot cover up, for example, weakened financial performance. 
3. Improving the liquidity. When the financial markets are liquid, investors can realize their 
shares and bonds effortlessly and quickly. Liquid financial markets make it possible to invest 
for long-term projects as investors can realize their investment when they want to.  
4. Spread the risk. It is not wise for an investor to invest all the wealth to one company or a 
bond, but to diversify the investment, for example, to several companies and thus reduce the 
risk. 
A sound financial system ensures that capital resources can be transferred there, where they 
are most efficient. A functioning financial market is therefore also important from the 
perspective of the society. (Malkamäki & Martikainen 1990: 28–30; Knüpfer & Puttonen 
2017: 53–54.) 
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2.1. Market efficiency 
 
The most important task of the capital market is to allocate ownership of securities. Generally 
speaking, the ideal market is the one that is able to produce precise signals to allocate 
resources. In such markets, securities’ prices include all available information. Based on this, 
it is possible to make investment decisions relying on the fact that the securities are correctly 
priced at all times. The market can be called efficient when the shares’ prices include all 
available information on the market. (Fama 1970.) 
Kendall (1953) finds in his research that it is impossible to predict future prices of shares 
based on a historical market data, as stock prices change randomly. This unpredictable and 
random variation of stock prices is called the random walk theory. Based on this theory, 
Kendall (1953) excogitates that the financial markets are efficient, prices reflect all available 
information and operate just like they should. In the literature, this idea is called the efficient 
market hypothesis. (Nikkinen, Rothovius & Sahlström 2002: 79–80; Bodie et al. 2005: 370–
371). 
Fama (1970) defines three conditions for market efficiency. Efficient markets (i) have no 
trading costs, (ii) all information is available for free to all market participants and (iii) all 
market participants agree on the impact of new information on share prices.  
Along with the concept of efficient markets, informative efficiency is also usually mentioned. 
The markets are informatively efficient when all information is included in the share price 
and when the price of a share changes immediately as the new information is revealed (Bodie 
et al. 2005: 370–371). If investors think that the price of a share is too low taking the current 
level of information into account, investors will begin to buy the share, which leads to an 
increase of the share price. According to the efficient market hypothesis, investors can obtain 
excess profits only momentarily. Pricing errors disappear quickly because investors use the 
pricing error until the share price reaches its equilibrium once again (Copeland, Weston & 
Shastri 2005). 
In practice, the markets have trading costs and taxes. Obtaining the information is not free 
either; it takes time to monitor and filter the information – time, that one could also use 
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otherwise. However, the theory of finance is aware of this and it is important to note that the 
markets can function efficiently even if they are not completely perfect (Knüpfer et al. 2017: 
168). As a counterargument to the efficient market hypothesis, one can propose, for example, 
the fact that there are numerous analysts in the markets whose job is to collect and analyze 
the information and use that information to find underpriced shares. If the markets were 
efficient, analysts’ work would be completely unnecessary as prices already reflect all that 
information. On the other hand, one could argue that a great number of analysts are the one 
taking care with their actions that the markets really do reflect all information (Nikkinen ym. 
2002: 82). 
 
2.2. Three levels of market efficiency 
 
Fama (1970) divides the market into three different categories and tests their degree of 
efficiency. He categorizes the efficient market hypothesis into a weak-form, a semi-strong 
and a strong-form markets. The grouping is based on how perfectly the information is 
realized in the price of a share. 
When the weak-form market conditions are in question, securities’ prices reflect all 
information that is related to the past trades. This information is derived from prices and 
trading volumes. Under this condition, analyzing historical information is useless as share 
prices change so fast that it is not possible to achieve excess returns. Furthermore, it is not 
possible to predict future price developments based on historical information. (Nikkinen et 
al. 2002: 83; Bodie ym. 2005: 371.) 
In accordance with the semi-strong form, stock prices include all publicly available 
information. Under these terms, it is not possible to predict the future share prices, for 
example, on the basis of companies’ earnings news or financial statements. The semi-strong 
form also includes the weak-form, as time series of share prices are public information. 
(Nikkinen et al. 2002: 83; Bodie et al. 2002: 372.) 
Strong-form terms are said to be met if stock prices reflect all information related to 
companies. This also includes undisclosed information, i.e. insider information. According 
17 
 
to the strong-form market efficiency, for example, decisions made by the board of directors 
are immediately reflected to the share price at the time of decision. This assumption is 
extreme and difficult to prove empirically. It is enacted in the security markets law that 
exploiting insider information is prohibited. (Nikkinen et al. 2002: 83; Bodie et al. 2005: 373; 
Knüpfer et al. 2017: 170.) 
Fama’s (1970) research has worked as a foundation for examining market efficiency. After 
his research, market efficiency has been studied a lot. Fama (1991) has later corrected his 
previous research by defining a new tripartition for market efficiency. According to the new 
grouping, the three divisions are: (i) return predictability, (ii) event studies and (iii) tests for 
private information.  
Fama’s (1991) changes relate mainly to the weak-form market efficiency conditions, as in 
the case of semi-strong and strong-form conditions, Fama (1991) wants to change mainly the 
names of the concepts and not their purpose. Testing for return predictability is added to the 
weak-form market efficiency, as the fluctuations in returns are no longer thought to be 
affected only by historical information, but also, for example, by dividends and interest rates. 
Because the semi-strong market efficiency is often studied using event studies, Fama (1991) 
considers that “event studies” as a concept describes the theory better. Event studies are used 
to test how quickly the market responds to an event, for example, to a publication of a 
company’s profit warning (Nikkinen et al. 2002: 85). Similarly with the semi-strong market 
efficiency, Fama (1991) changes only the name of the concept “strong-form market 
efficiency” and keeps the theory related unchanged. 
2.3. Determining the share price 
 
Valuation models are based on calculating the present value of cash flows received by a 
shareholder, which is the most important task when applying valuation models. One must 
define a rate of return that is used to discount cash flows. The required rate of return should 
reflect the risk of the company. The higher risk will result in a higher rate of return. (Nikkinen 
et. al 2002.) 
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An investor receives cash flows from a share as dividends. The share price is the sum of the 
present value of future dividends and the price of the share at the end of the investment 
horizon. However, the price of a share is often determined without using the price of the 
share at the end of the investment horizon. This term is often omitted from the equation, since 
it is not sensible to use the price of the share that is to be determined, even if on a different 
period. The investment horizon is often considered limitless, as the principal is never returned 
to the investor. Essentially, the capital remains in the company forever. As the investment 
horizon increases, the future price of the share reduces close to a zero, and therefore is often 
ignored. Now, the share price can be determined solely on the basis of the present value of 
future dividends: 
(1)  𝑃0 =  ∑
𝐷𝑡
(1+𝑟)𝑡
 ,∞𝑡=1  
where  P0 = price of the share 
  D = dividend per share 
  n = the last period of the investment horizon 
  r = required rate of return. (Knüpfer et al. 2017: 95–96.) 
Equation 1 shows only the most basic valuation model for a share. There are several other 
models that add more variables. One example is the model by Gordon & Shapiro (1956) 
which takes the annual growth rate of the dividend into account. The above model is a 
valuation model used to determine a company’s share price. To calculate a share price, one 
needs to know the correct required rate of return. There are separate models to determine the 
rate of return. Next, three of these models are presented briefly: CAPM, and the three-factor 
and the five-factor models by Fama & French (1996 & 2015). 
The CAPM, Capital Asset Pricing Model, is a stock market equilibrium model developed by 
Sharpe (1964). The CAPM is considered to be perhaps the most important cornerstone of 
modern financial theory. The CAPM binds the expected return of the share directly to its 
risk: the higher the risk, the greater the return. (Nikkinen et al. 2002: 68.) 
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The CAPM is based on Markowitz’s (1952) portfolio theory. The portfolio theory is based 
on an idea that diversification can be used to reduce the risk of a portfolio. In this case, the 
portfolio is constructed by choosing shares that do not strongly correlate with each other. 
The risk of a share can be divided into a non-systematic and systematic risk. Non-systematic 
risk refers to a firm-specific risk and systematic risk refers to market risk. Market risk consists 
of macroeconomic factors that affect all securities, such as interest rates and inflation. Non-
systematic risk refers to, for example, the probability of an individual company being forced 
into a bankruptcy. With good diversification, it is possible to reduce the non-systematic risk 
to zero. Therefore, any remaining risk is systematic risk, as it is not possible to diversify 
systematic risk (Bodie et al. 2005: 283–284.) Therefore, in practice, investors expose their 
assets only to systematic risk, which is precisely the risk that investors demand return for. 
(Knüpfer et al. 2017: 153). 
The CAPM has received lot of criticism mainly because of its several assumptions (see Fama 
& French 2004)), but even still it is widely accepted in the financial markets, and is used, for 
example, in brokerage firms and in real investment planning. The first criticism towards the 
CAPM that gained large publicity was presented by Roll (1977). He argues that it is not 
possible to identify the true market portfolio. Therefore, testing the CAPM is impossible. 
(Nikkinen et al. 2002: 75.) 
The CAPM is unable to explain size and value anomalies (discussed in chapter 3.1.), which 
is one of the reasons it gives an incorrect estimation of stock returns. For this reason, Fama 
et al. (1996) present a three-factor model to explain share returns. The three-factor model by 
Fama et al. (1996) can be represented in the following way: 
(2)  𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑀 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 . 
The first factor is the market factor Rim, which is the return of a stock index minus the risk-
free rate. The second factor is the size factor SMBt (Small Minus Big), which is the share 
returns of small companies minus the share returns of large companies. The third factor HMLt 
(High Minus Low) is obtained by deducting returns of companies’ that have a high B/M ratio 
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from returns of companies’ that have a low B/M ratio. In the model, βiM, βiSMB and βiHML 
denote the sensitivity of different portfolios.  
Fama et al. (1996) find that their model manages to explain the grievances on the stock 
market. However, Black (1993) criticizes that when researchers browse stock return 
databases, they may find certain types of regularities by chance. For example, he states that 
the significance of the firm size effect has mainly disappeared. Nevertheless, Fama et al. 
(1993) believe that because the firm size effect and the B/M ratio have successfully predicted 
returns over several different time periods and all around the world, the use of these factors 
is justified. 
Fama & French (2015) add two new factors, RMWt and CMAt, to the previous three-factor 
model. The five-factor model can be written in the following way: 
(3)  𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑀𝑅𝑖𝑀 + 𝛽𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +
                       𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡. 
RMWt (robust minus weak) describes the profitability of a company. It is the difference in 
returns between well-diversified portfolios, where the share returns of high profitability 
companies is deducted from the share returns of low profitability companies. CMAt 
(conservative minus aggressive) is an investment factor. Similarly, it is the difference in 
returns between well-diversified portfolios, where the share returns of high investment rate 
companies is deducted from the share returns of low investment rate companies. 
Fama et al. (2015) conclude in their research that the five-factor model explains share returns 
better than the old three-factor model. Furthermore, they also find that in the five-factor 
model, HMLt appears to be unavailing, as the two new factors, RMWt and CMAt, absorb its 
effect. Thus, if an investor is interested only in explaining abnormal returns, according to 
Fama et al. (2015), a four-factor model where HMLt has been omitted functions just as well 
as the five-factor model. However, they state that the biggest problem with the five-factor 
model, and in fact with all pricing models, is explaining returns of small companies. The 
five-factor model has difficulties explaining, for example, share returns of small companies 
that do not generate robust profits and invest aggressively.  
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3. BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 
 
Cognitive and emotional weaknesses affect all people. However, traditional finance theory 
ignores these cognitive biases and human emotions, as it assumes that investors act only 
rationally. The traditional finance theory examines how people should behave. Behavioral 
finance examines human errors and examines how people actually behave in a financial 
setting. Behavioral finance does not expect that investors behave rationally, but understands 
that humans are not always capable of acting rationally. Humans tend to be irrational. 
Behavioral finance combines psychology and finance to explain features of financial 
markets. (Baker & Nofsinger 2002.)  
Empirical studies support the idea that investors act irrationally. Kaplanski, Levy, Veld & 
Veld-Merkoulova (2014) state that stock prices are correlated with several noneconomic 
factors. To name a few, they argue that weather conditions, season of the year and sporting 
events have all be found to affect stock prices.  
Behavioral finance can be divided into two categories: investor psychology and limits to 
arbitrage. According to the efficient market theory, taking advantage of arbitrage 
opportunities is simple, and prices quickly revert to their fundamental values. However, 
behavioral finance argues that investor psychology has a significant impact on how prices 
are formed in the market. Furthermore, in reality, it is very hard, if not impossible, to find 
arbitrage opportunities that are completely riskless. (Shleifer & Summers 1990.)  
According to the efficient market hypothesis, if investors make rational decisions, prices of 
securities are the same as their fundamental value. However, in reality, investors do not 
always behave rationally. Naturally, this means that prices do not always correspond the 
fundamental value. This mispricing opens an opportunity for rational arbitrageurs to enjoy 
abnormal returns. These arbitrageurs take advantage of this mispricing and according to the 
efficient market hypothesis, the arbitrage opportunity disappears quickly. However, 
behavioral finance argues that such mispricing is not easy to exploit as it may hold risks and 
additional costs. Therefore, the mispricing can remain unexploited. Such barriers that rational 
arbitrageurs face are called limits to arbitrage. (Barberis & Thaler 2003: 1054–1055.) 
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Limits to arbitrage can be divided into three categories (Bodie et al. 2014: 394-395): 
1. Fundamental risk. Suppose that a share is underpriced. An investor can buy this share to 
capitalize the opportunity to gain profit. However, this act cannot be considered riskless, as 
there is no certainty that the share price would not decline even more. Another factor is the 
investor’s investment horizon. Even though the underpricing may eventually be corrected, 
there is no way to know how long it will take. If the correction takes a long time, the investor 
may have already sold her security. This kind of risk limits the activity and efficiency of an 
arbitrageur. 
2. Implementation costs. Exploiting mispricing can be difficult because of trading costs. 
Moreover, short selling can be impossible because of regulation, which lowers the 
possibilities of arbitrageurs.  
3. Model risk. It is difficult to evaluate if one has really found a mispricing. The valuation 
model used to determine the mispricing can be faulty. There is always a possibility that the 
price is actually right. Because of this risk, arbitrageur might decide to not pursue the 
arbitrage opportunity any further. 
There are several cognitive biases that people are affected by (see for example Hirshleifer 
2001; Baker et al. 2002). I cover the following biases: overconfidence, belief bias, anchoring, 
availability bias, ostrich effect and negativity bias. These biases are chosen because 
investors’ response to profit warnings can be influenced by these common biases.  
People tend to be too overconfident about their own abilities. For example, most drivers rank 
themselves as better-than-average drivers. Moreover, many investors think that they can beat 
the market by active trading, even though many studies suggest that it is extremely hard to 
beat the market. Barber & Odean (2001) find that especially single men trade significantly 
more actively than women. The study suggests that men are more overconfident than women. 
(Bodie et al. 2014: 390.)  
Belief bias occurs when a decision or response is made focusing on the believability of the 
conclusion rather than by logical validity. Prior researches about the belief bias suggest that 
people are more willing to accept conclusions that they believe to be true. In other words, 
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people tend to reject any conclusions that they believe to be false. Henle & Michael (1956) 
illustrate the belief bias in their study by giving two syllogisms: (i) all Russians are 
Bolsheviks and (ii) Some Bolsheviks regiment people. There is no competent conclusion to 
this syllogism. However, subjects with an anti-Russian attitude might endorse the unfit 
conclusion that all Russians regiment people. (Evans, Newstead & Byrne 1993: 243.) 
When making estimates, people tend to use starting points or initial values when adjusting 
the estimates. The initial value affects the final estimate even if the initial value has nothing 
to do with the actual topic that is being estimated. This phenomenon is called anchoring. For 
example, people were asked to estimate the percentage of the United Nations that were 
African nations. Before the estimation, the subjects spun a roulette wheel that stopped on 
either 10 or 65. For those subjects that spun the low value, guessed lower values than those 
subjects that spun the high value. Subjects who spun 10 guessed 25% and those who spun 65 
guessed 45%. In another study, high-school students were asked to estimate within five 
seconds a numerical expression. Group one estimated the product 8*7*6*4*5*4*3*2*1 and 
the group two estimated the product 1*2*3*4*5*6*7*8. Because the first equation starts with 
higher numbers, the answer for the first equation was estimated to be higher. The median 
estimate for the first group was 2 250 whereas the median estimate for the second group was 
512. The correct answer is 40 320. (Tversky & Kahneman 1974.) 
The availability bias is a mental shortcut for people to evaluate topics or situations. People 
might assess the frequency of a class or the probability of an event by using information that 
is easy to remember. One may assess the risk of a heart attack by recalling such incidences 
among one’s vicinity. Furthermore, people put a higher weight for information that is more 
recent. (Tversky et al. 1974.) 
Ostrich effect refers to a cognitive bias when people tend to ignore bad or ambiguous news. 
They tend to not seek for additional information and decide to “put their heads in the sand” 
to protect themselves from any further negative information. For example, investors are less 
likely to check the value of their portfolios in down markets. This is exactly what Karlsson, 
Loewenstein & Seppi (2009) find in their study. They find that the ostrich effect is clearly 
visible in the financial markets. Moreover, they argue that this kind of behavior should be 
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observed in any situation in which people care about information and have ability to protect 
themselves from it. The authors illustrate this by giving an example of parents of children 
with chronic problems. Such parents might be prone to avoid the problem until those 
problems become clearly visible for other people who are not as emotionally involved.   
Negativity bias means that humans tend to react more strongly to negative information than 
to comparably extreme positive information. Specifically, negative information is evaluated 
more strongly than positive information and remains in memory better (Ito, Larsen, Smith & 
Cacioppo 1998). Furthermore, Bargh, Chaiken, Govender & Pratto (1992) find that 
evaluations stored in memory become active on the mere presence or mention of the object 
in the environment. Therefore, combining this theory with the ostrich effect and SAD, there 
is a possibility that because of the depression that SAD causes, investors may temporarily 
ignore the negative information. However, this information is still in their subconscious, and 
after the depression caused by SAD decreases, investors might recall the negative profit 
warning, especially when the earnings announcement could act as a trigger that activates the 
stored memory. 
3.1. Anomalies – regular deviations from market efficiency 
 
In an efficient stock market, the best estimate of the fair value of a share is the market value 
and possible over or underpricings are quickly corrected to their true value. Consequently, in 
an efficient stock market, it is not possible for an investor to continuously achieve higher 
risk-adjusted returns than the market on average. (Malkamäki et al. 1990: 113.) 
The underlying assumption of the efficient market is the Capital Asset Pricing model 
(CAPM). According to the CAP-model, stock returns are determined by the risk-free rate and 
the systematic risk of the share. However, in empirical studies, it has been observed that there 
are certain unsolved regularities that cannot be explained by systematic risk. These kinds of 
regular exceptional phenomena, which persist for a long time, deviate from market 
efficiency. These phenomena are called anomalies. (Malkamäki et al. 1990: 113; Nikkinen 
et al. 2002: 86.) 
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The existence of anomalies has challenged the efficient market hypothesis. Investors can 
obtain abnormal returns by utilizing anomalies, which according to the efficient market 
hypothesis, should not be possible. (Mehdian & Perry 2002.) 
Fama & French (1996) argue that anomalies are not evidence of market inefficiency, as one 
of the reasons for anomalies can be the way how the risk is measured. The risk is often 
measured using the CAPM, which assumptions are not suitable for the actual market 
situation. Therefore, the CAPM fails to estimate the true risk correctly, which is why the 
model gives an incorrect estimate of the returns of the share. Since the CAPM fails to explain 
anomalies, new models have been developed to seek better explanations to anomalies, such 
as the previously introduced Fama & French factor models.  
The problem with measuring market efficiency is the so-called joint hypothesis problem. The 
problem is that examining market efficiency is challenging or even impossible, because it 
must be tested using a pricing model. The used pricing model has to predict future returns, 
which must be compared to the realized returns. However, the pricing model should take all 
possible factors affecting the share price into account and it should explain future returns 
impeccably. In other words, it is difficult to prove that the used pricing model is the correct 
one. Consequently, anomalies can be explained because of market inefficiency, an incorrect 
pricing model or because of a poor estimation of the expected return. (Fama 1991.) 
Numerous of anomalies are found in financial markets (see Noxy-Marx 2014). Next, few 
common anomalies are presented: firm size anomaly, B/M anomaly, P/E anomaly and post-
earnings announcement drift (PEAD) anomaly. Previous studies have found that these 
anomalies affect the magnitude of the outcome of the profit warning, which is why these 
anomalies are important to review. In addition, Halloween effect is presented, as this can be 
thought to overlap with the SAD effect.  
3.1.1. Firm size anomaly 
 
Banz (1981) finds in his research that the returns of small and large companies differ. He 
names this phenomenon as firm size anomaly. He investigates the shares listed on the New 
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York Stock Exchange in 1926–1975. The shares are separated into two different portfolios 
based on their market value and therefore, divided into small or large companies. As a result, 
during this period, the average annual return of small companies was always higher than the 
average annual return of large companies. The difference between large and small 
companies’ returns remains significant even if a risk-adjusted model is used. Because of this, 
one cannot conclude that the higher risk of small companies completely explains the firm 
size anomaly.  
The so-called January effect is also closely related to the firm size anomaly. It has been 
observed, that especially in January, companies’ stock returns increase more than on average. 
The January effect has been shown to affect particularly small companies, as the returns of 
small companies are at their highest specifically in January. On an annual basis, a significant 
portion of the firm size anomaly occurs in January. The relationship between the January 
effect and the firm size anomaly has been studied a lot and the results have been similar (see 
Watchel 1942; Rozeff & Kinney 1976; Keim 1983). Blume & Stambaugh (1983) state that, 
on average, the firm size anomaly originates from January alone. 
The firm size anomaly is often explained by the fact that smaller companies are riskier than 
large companies, which is why investors demand higher return for them (Chan, Chen & Hsieh 
(1985). Another explanation could be institutional investors’ minor interest towards small 
companies. In this case, there is less information available on small companies. Small 
companies are analyzed less than large companies and their bid-ask spread can be wide. 
Smaller amount of information and worse liquidity cause risks and trading costs, which 
requires investors to demand higher returns (Arbel & Strebel 1983; Amimud & Mendelson 
1986). 
Chan & Chen (1991) find that the firm size anomaly does not originate from the size of the 
companies itself, but from characteristics of small companies. Furthermore, they state that 
small companies react differently to macroeconomic information. Small companies also 
include so-called marginal companies, which have financial difficulties: they have been 
losing their market value, have weak cash flows and have lot of debt. Portfolios that are 
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formed of small companies, include large number of such companies, which is why the 
higher returns of small companies could be explained by the higher level of risk. 
3.1.2. B/M anomaly 
 
Fama & French (1992) show in their research that investors can use the B/M ratio to predict 
future returns. The B/M ratio is the book value of a company’s share divided by the market 
value of the company’s share. If a company has a high B/M ratio, it is called a value company 
and, in the opposite case, a growth company. Fama et al. (1992) group companies into ten 
different portfolios according to their B/M ratio and study the returns of these portfolios 
during 1963–1990. According to their study, companies with a high B/M ratio have higher 
stock returns than those with a low B/M ratio. Fama et al. (1992) also investigate the 
causations of a B/M ratio and a company size. They find that a company’s beta coefficient 
measured by the CAPM cannot explain returns of small companies or returns of value 
companies. 
Instead of using the CAPM, Fama & French (1996) use their three-factor model to study the 
B/M anomaly. Even if the three-factor model is used, shares with a higher B/M ratio still 
seem to have higher returns. Kothari, Shanken & Sloan (1995) also study the B/M anomaly. 
However, they find that when betas are estimated on an annual basis instead of a monthly 
basis, shares with higher betas generate higher returns. They conclude that the significance 
of the B/M anomaly may be somewhat weaker than what Fama et al. (1992) document in 
their research. 
La Porta (1996) argues that the poor ability of analysts to forecast future earnings may explain 
the B/M anomaly. In his research, he finds that companies that had low earnings growth 
forecasts actually succeeded better than companies that had high earnings growth forecasts. 
Therefore, analysts are said to be too pessimistic toward companies with low earnings growth 
prospects. Similarly, analysts appear to be too optimistic toward companies with high 
earnings growth prospects. 
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3.1.3. P/E anomaly 
 
The P/E ratio is a key figure where a company’s share price is divided by the company’s 
earnings per share from last year (Bodie et al. 2005: 47). Basu (1977) finds that shares with 
a low P/E ratio are more profitable than shares with a high P/E ratio. Furthermore, the result 
does not change even if a risk-adjusted model is used. Booth, Martikainen, Perttunen & Yli-
Olli (1994) investigate the P/E anomaly during 1976–1986 both on the U.S. and the Finnish 
market. These markets differ considerably in terms of size, for example. Although the 
markets are very different, the P/E anomaly is observed on both markets: shares with a low 
P/E ratio generate better returns than shares with a high P/E ratio. 
Analyzing and calculation the P/E ratio is extremely easy, which makes it strange that using 
such a simple method could be used to earn abnormal returns. One explanation to the P/E 
anomaly could be that the market equilibrium model does not measure the risk correctly. If 
two companies have the same expected earnings, but the other company is riskier, its share 
price is lower and, by definition, its P/E ratio is also lower. The higher risk is reflected as a 
higher expected return. (Bodie et al. 2005: 389.) 
3.1.4. Post-earnings-announcement drift 
 
The basic assumption of the efficient market hypothesis is that all new information is 
immediately reflected to the price of a share (Bodie et al. 2005: 392). Ball & Brown (1968) 
find in their research that stock prices continue to develop in the direction of an earnings 
surprise for several days after the publication of the surprise. In the case of a negative 
earnings surprise, share prices continued to decline after the publication of the result. In the 
case of a positive earnings surprise, share prices continued to increase after the publication 
of the result. This phenomenon is called post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD). Many 
other scholars have also observed the same phenomenon (see Foster, Olsen & Shevlin 1984 
Bernard & Thomas 1989; Kim & Kim 2003; Sadka 2006). 
Foster et al. (1984) find a clear evidence supporting PEAD phenomenon. They divide 
companies into ten portfolios according to the magnitude of the earnings surprise. They find 
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that share prices continued to develop parallel to the earnings surprise. The more positive 
(negative) the surprise is, the more positive (negative) the post-announcement abnormal 
returns are. Bernard et al. (1989) argue that the explanation of the phenomenon may be the 
incorrect assumptions of the CAPM. They state that trading costs have a significant impact 
and investors are not able to absorb new information properly.  
Kim et al. (2003) construct a four-factor model, which they use to explain PEAD. They add 
a fourth factor, unexpected earnings surprise, to the Fama & French three-factor model. 
Using this model, with the exception of the first two days after the earnings announcement, 
the cumulative returns of 60 days after the announcement are no longer statistically 
significant. Their model explains PEAD better than the Fama & French three-factor model, 
which still shows statistically significant results after 60 days of the announcement. As a 
conclusion, PEAD reported in prior studies may be due to an incorrect model and a failure 
of measuring risk. Also Sadka (2006) argues that PEAD is due to an unsuccessful 
measurement of risk. According to him, liquidity risk affects PEAD and pricing models 
should include a component that takes this risk into consideration.  
3.1.5. Halloween effect 
 
Halloween effect (also Halloween indicator) is presumable originally inherited from a saying 
“Sell in May and go away.” Bouman & Jacobsen (2002) are the first to document significant 
results of this anomaly, which states that stock returns are lower during May through 
September than during the rest of the year. They examine 37 different countries and find that 
in 36 of them, the returns are higher from November through April than during the rest of the 
year. The results are robust even if risk, measured by the standard deviation, is taken into 
consideration. The standard deviation of the two different periods is fairly constant and does 
not differ significantly between the two periods. 
Bouman et al. (2002) try explaining the anomaly with several different hypothesis. They 
examine if interest rates, trading volume, the size of the agricultural sector, vacations, news, 
January effect or data mining could explain the phenomenon. However, the only significant 
explanatory factor is found to be vacations, and more precisely the length and the timing of 
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the vacations and their impact on trading activity. Interestingly, at least according to the 
efficient market hypothesis, this kind of behavior should be easily exploited by arbitrageurs. 
Therefore, if this is taken as the explanation, this kind of anomaly should not persist in long-
term. 
Jacobsen & Zhang (2012) study the Halloween effect in 108 different stock markets around 
the world. They find that the returns are higher during November–April than during May–
October in 81 countries. The difference of these returns is statistically significant in 35 
countries, where conversely two of the countries have higher returns during May–October. 
According to their research, there is no evidence that the Halloween effect has weakened in 
the recent years. On the contrary, it seems like the anomaly has strengthened. However, 
Dichtl & Drobetz (2014) challenge prior studies by examining the recent studies using data-
snooping resistant simulations. As a result, they state that Halloween effect has decreased or 
completely vanished during the recent years and that the Sell in May strategy has never 
offered statistically significant higher returns than the traditional buy-and-hold strategy. 
 
3.2. Risk Aversion 
 
Risk aversion measures the amount of uncertainty that a human is willing to take. Risk averse 
investors do not want to invest on portfolios that have fair risk-return profile or worse. 
Instead, they consider risk-free or speculative prospects with positive risk premiums. Assume 
that an investor can assign a utility score to different portfolios according to their expected 
return and risk. Those portfolios with more attractive risk-return profiles have higher values 
of utility. The utility function can be expressed in the following way: 
(4)  𝑈 = 𝐸(𝑟) − 0,5𝐴𝜎2 . 
The utility value is denoted by U and A is an index of the investor’s risk aversion. As the 
equation shows, higher expected returns enhance the utility and higher amount of risk 
diminishes the utility. (Bodie et al. 2014: 170.) 
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The level of risk aversion of individual investors can be estimated by different questionnaires. 
Moreover, researchers track behaviour of groups of individuals to determine average levels 
of risk aversion. (Bodie et al. 2014: 174.) 
However, as the above model focuses only on asset risk and return, behavioral finance 
focuses as well on affect. This means that investors may have “good” or “bad” feelings that 
affect their choices in the financial markets. For example, companies that have good 
reputation for socially responsible policies can have higher affect in public perception. 
Investors’ feelings can drive up prices of these stocks. (Bodie et al. 2014: 393.) 
Prospect theory, which originated from the study of Kahneman & Tversky (1979), challenge 
the conventional thought about rational risk-averse investors. Figure 1 shows the 
conventional utility function of a risk-averse investor. As can be seen, higher wealth leads to 
higher utility, but at a diminishing rate. A loss of 1 000 euros reduces the utility more than a 
gain of 1 000 euros increases it. Hence, investors are keen to reject those risky prospects that 
do not offer risk premiums. (Bodie et al. 2014: 393.) 
Figure 2 illustrates the utility function under prospect theory. As can be seen, the utility no 
longer depends on the amount of wealth, but on changes in it from current levels. On the left 
side of the figure the curve is convex rather than concave. Several conventional utility 
functions predicate that investors may become less risk averse as wealth increases. However, 
as can be seen from the figure, the function re-centers on current wealth. This means that 
such decreases in risk aversion are ruled out. Furthermore, the figure shows that because of 
the convex curvature to the left of the origin, investors tend to become more risk seeking 
rather than risk averse when it comes to losses. For example, Coval & Shumway (2005) find 
that traders in the T-bond futures contract market appear to be highly loss-averse. If traders 
lost money during morning sessions, they assume significantly higher risk in afternoon 
sessions. (Bodie et al. 2014: 393.) 
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Figure 1. Conventional utility function (Bodie et al. 2014: 393). 
 
Figure 2. Utility function under prospect theory (Bodie et al. 2014: 393). 
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3.3. Seasonal Affective Disorder 
 
Seasonal affective disorder (SAD) is related to the changing of the seasons (Rosenthal, Sack, 
Gillin, Lewy, Goodwin, Davenport & Wehr (1984). Specifically, SAD is a medical condition 
that is characterized by a depressed mood during times when the amount of daylight is low. 
In other words, as Molin, Mellerup, Bolwig, Scheike & Dam (1996) and Young Meaden, 
Forgg, Cherin & Eastman (1997) report in their studies, this kind of seasonal depression is 
increased when hours of daylight are declining. Rosenthal (1998) and Kamstra, Kramer, Levi 
& Wermers (2017) find evidence that even those people who are not affected by SAD might 
be affected by “winter blues”, which can cause milder mood changes. 
SAD causes several symptoms, such as social withdrawal, decreased activity, sadness, 
anxiety, lowered sex-drive, poor quality of sleep, and increased appetite and weight gain. As 
the amount of daylight starts to increase after the winter solstice, SAD sufferers cognitive 
functions start to improve. Moreover, light therapy has been documented as a practical 
treatment for SAD, which supports the hypothesis that the decreasing amount of daylight is 
the main driver of SAD. (Partonen & Lönnqvist 1998.)  
Magnusson (2000) reviews 20 retrospective studies about SAD and reports that the 
prevalence of SAD has been reported to be from 0% to 9,7%. The review suggests that SAD 
is more prevalent at the higher northern latitudes, but also that the prevalence of SAD varies 
across different ethnic groups. However, Magnusson (2000) states that all things considered, 
SAD seems to be a relatively common disorder. Interestingly, even though SAD is reported 
to be more prevalent at northern latitudes, which is also strongly suggested by Dowling & 
Lucey (2008), Iceland seems to be an outlier. Magnusson & Stefansson (1993) study the SAD 
in Iceland and find that Icelanders seem to be not affected by it. Cott & Hibbeln (2001) 
suggest that the large consumption of fish compared to other Nordic countries could be one 
explanation. They argue that acids that fish contain, such as Omega 3, decrease the amount 
of depression. Naturally, this would decrease the amount of depression caused by SAD, too. 
As SAD causes depression, it also affects emotions and moods of people, and therefore, it 
affects decision making of people, too. Wright & Bower (1992) report that those who are in 
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good mood tend to make more optimistic decisions. Furthermore, those people evaluate their 
surroundings more positively. For example, they tend to have a higher level of life 
satisfaction, and they also tend to view past events, other people, and consumer products 
more positively. Furthermore, people who are in bad moods find negative information more 
available or salient (Forgas & Bower (1987). 
Schwarz (1990) and Sinclair & Mark (1995) document that people in bad moods are more 
engaged in detailed analytical activity, whereas people in good moods do not process 
information as critically. Furthermore, Mackie & Worth (1991) find that those in good moods 
are more receptive not only to weak arguments, but strong ones as well. However, Isen (2000) 
reminds that the interpretation of the results of such studies examining psychological effects 
can be difficult and complex.  
Psychologist have been documenting correlation between sunshine and behavior for decades 
(Hirshleifer & Shumway 2003). For example, correlation between lack of sunshine and 
depression has been documented by Eagles (1994). Moreover, Tietjen & Kripke (1994) show 
in their research that lack of sunshine is also linked to suicides. Hirshleifer et al. (2003) 
conclude that most evidence suggests that people feel better when they are exposed to 
sunshine.  
According to prior studies (see Molin et al. 1996; Schwarz et al. 1983; Young et al. 1997), 
SAD rises individuals’ risk aversion when the amount of daylight is at its lowest, i.e. during 
the fall and winter. Moreover, Kramer & Weber (2012) find evidence that the depression 
associated with SAD affects risk aversion of investors. The authors use a survey with real 
financial payoffs to find that as the level of depression of SAD sufferers increases, choices 
that contain less risk are more frequently chosen.  
Naturally, the medical literature has also been interested in explaining if depression causes 
heightened risk aversion among investors. Grable & Roszkowski (2008) conclude that there 
are two competing theories that explain how mood affects investors’ risk aversion. These are 
the affect infusion model (AIM) and the mood maintenance hypothesis (MMH). The affect 
infusion model is supported by, for example, Forgas (1995), Smoski, Lynch, Rosenthal, 
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Cheavens, Chapman & Krishnan (2008) and Kamstra et al. (2012). Forgas (1995) finds that 
negative mood leads to a heightened risk aversion and positive mood decreases it. 
Specifically, he finds that those in good moods are more probable to focus on positive 
environmental cues. On the other hand, those in bad moods tend to focus on negative 
incidents. Smoski et al. (2008) find that depressed individuals are less likely to participate in 
risky gambles. 
Isen, Nygren & Ashby (1998) and Isen & Patrick (1983) suggest that the MMH theory is the 
correct theory. According to the MMH theory, people in positive mood are less willing to 
take risks because they want to preserve their current state. On the contrary, those who are 
depressed might want to take additional risks in hope that their current state would become 
more positive. 
In the case of SAD, Kramer et al. (2012) argue that AIM explains the phenomenon better 
because an individual is in relatively persistent negative mood state. They also argue that 
MMH is more related to a behavior of an individual that is affected by more temporarily 
induced mood state. This thinking is supported by studies of Pietromonaco & Rook (1987), 
Smoski et al. (2008) and Raghunathan & Pham (1999). Pietromonaco et al. (1987) find 
evidence that depression is linked with heightened risk aversion, whereas Raghunathan et al. 
(1999) find that those individuals who are suffering from a temporary sadness are more 
willing to take part in riskier gambles.  
Taking all this into consideration, the SAD hypothesis is that because sunlight affects the 
mood positively, the decreasing amount of daylight causes increased levels of depression and 
bad mood. As documented by Molin et al. (1996) and Young et al. (1997), this leads to a 
heightened risk aversion during the SAD season, i.e. during the fall and winter. This 
heightened risk aversion is thought to affect the financial markets. Given the link between 
depression and risk-taking, investors may be averse to buy upon good news and sell upon 
bad news, as hypothesized by Lin (2015). In the case of profit warnings, this would lead to a 
smaller magnitude of immediate response and a subsequent larger PEAD during SAD 
months. Prior studies about how SAD affects financial markets are reviewed in chapter 5.4. 
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4. LISTED COMPANY’S DISCLOSURE OBLIGATION 
 
The purpose of the disclosure obligation is to ensure that investors have the correct and 
sufficient information on companies’ situations. For example, listed company’s disclosure 
obligation requires companies to report regularly on their financial development and on any 
surprising changes in their business or profitability. Due to the disclosure obligation, 
investors can rely on market functioning rationally and that capital is allocated to the most 
profitable targets. Securities market control is based on the idea that every investor has 
perfect information on companies, markets and prevailing prices. Furthermore, the disclosure 
obligation makes information more symmetric for market participants. Naturally, company 
executives are more aware of the situation of their company than investors are, but the 
disclosure obligation ensures that this insider information also transpires to investors’ 
knowledge. (Huovinen 2004: 3–5.)  
Traditionally, the disclosure obligation is divided into a periodic disclosure obligation and 
into an ongoing disclosure obligation. The periodic disclosure obligation states that 
companies must report about their financial development. Companies must regularly publish, 
for example, a quarterly report, a management interim report, a financial statement bulletin, 
a financial report, an annual report and an annual summary. (Leppiniemi 2009: 126.) 
The ongoing disclosure obligation means that a company has a continuous obligation to 
immediately publish all relevant information that may have an impact on the value of its 
share. Companies disclose such information by publishing an announcement, which is sent 
to the market operator and to the media at the same time. Particular caution must be exercised 
if a company’s securities are quoted in market places in several countries. The new 
information must be reported simultaneously to all market places. In general, companies do 
not announce new information when the company’s shares are traded in one market place 
while another market place is still closed. (Leppiniemi 2009: 126–127.) 
When information that has a significant impact on the share price arises, a company must 
publish a stock exchange announcement.  Such situations include, for example, acquisitions, 
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acquisitions of own shares or a weakened financial performance, in which case the company 
should announce a profit warning. (Leppiniemi 2009: 126–127.) 
When a company is considering publishing a stock exchange announcement, the company 
must think about the relevance of the information and its potential effects on the value of a 
share from an investor’s point of view. The relevance of the information is always company-
specific, and it can be influenced by the company’s internal changes and by changes in the 
external operational environment. Overall, if a company has handled its disclosure obligation 
in a satisfying manner, a publishing of the financial statement or a quarterly report should 
not result in a significant change in the company’s share price. (Mars, Virtanen & Virtanen 
2000: 70–73; Leppiniemi 2009: 127.) 
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5. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
 
This chapter has three main parts. First, Kothari’s (2001) study of earnings response 
coefficient (ERC) is briefly reviewed to offer basic knowledge about earnings surprises. Even 
though profit warnings are generally examined using abnormal returns, the review of 
Kothari’s (2001) study on ERC is relevant, because, in the end, a profit warning is just an 
extreme case of earnings report. Second, prior studies about companies’ motives to announce 
profit warnings are examined. Third, prior studies on the markets’ reactions to profit 
warnings are presented. Finally, previous studies on SAD’s impacts on the stock market are 
reviewed in detail. 
If a company has taken care of the requirements of its on-going disclosure obligation in a 
satisfying manner, neither the financial statement nor the interim report should cause a 
significant change in the company’s share price. However, if they do cause a significant 
change in the share price, one can state that there is some information that has not been 
immediately reflected into the price of the share. In this case, the markets are not efficient. 
In a similar way, according to the efficient market hypothesis, a profit warning should not 
result in a significant change in the share price. As a concept, an earnings report is close to a 
profit warning. The most significant difference between the two is that the earnings report is 
published on a regular basis. On the announcement date, whether it is a profit warning or an 
earnings report, the price of the share should not experience a significant change.  
It is essential to review the fundamentals of profit warnings in detail to get a comprehensive 
understanding of the phenomenon. In order to examine the effect of SAD on profit warnings, 
first, one must understand the motives for publishing a profit warning and what kind of 
reactions can result from the publication of the profit warning. A review of prior studies also 
offers a good foundation for the research section of the thesis. In the research section, in 
chapter 7, I investigate whether the publication of a profit warning causes abnormal returns 
in Finland during 2011–2017. Furthermore, the main interest in this thesis is to examine how 
SAD affects those abnormal returns. The relation between SAD and profit warnings has not 
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been previously studied, which is the reason I review prior studies about the impacts of SAD 
on quarterly earnings reports and the stock market in general. 
5.1. Earnings response coefficient 
 
Kothari (2001) examines how much the price of a share changes when the earnings of a 
company are announced. This change is measured by the earnings response coefficient 
(ERC). In order to estimate the magnitude of this coefficient, one must choose a valuation 
model, predict future revenues, and determine the discount rate. To predict future revenues, 
financial statements of the company are often used. The magnitude of the coefficient is 
influenced in particular by four factors: persistence, risk, growth opportunities, and interest 
rate. Persistence means that the greater the expectation of the future earnings of the market 
is, the greater the coefficient is (Kormendi & Lipe 1987; Easton & Zmijewski (1989). Easton 
et al. (1989) state that risk, in this context, refers to a systematic risk and it has a negative 
effect on ERC; the higher the risk, the higher the interest rate and thus the smaller discounted 
value. 
Collins & Kothari (1989) explain that growth opportunities refer either to ongoing projects 
or future projects that are expected to yield higher return than their risk-adjusted rate of return 
suggests. However, this is not a proof of market inefficiency, as this only means that the 
company has extra pricing power, for example, because of a monopoly position. Obviously, 
growth opportunities affect the coefficient positively. Collins et al. (1989) continue that 
interest rate refers to the risk-free rate, which affects the coefficient negatively. Naturally, 
the higher risk-free rate increases the discount rate and thus reduces the magnitude of the 
coefficient. 
ERC has been found to be empirically too small; the share price changes less than valuation 
models estimate. This can be explained by at least four different hypotheses. The first 
hypothesis is that the estimation of the result, and in particular the assessment of the 
“surprise” part of earnings report or profit warning, is difficult. Second, the market 
inefficiency can be considered. If the market is not able to interpret the earnings surprise 
correctly, the coefficient is smaller than it should be. It has been observed that the markets 
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underreact to earnings surprises and the new information is gradually reflected into the price 
of the share. One example of this could be the previously demonstrated post-earnings-
announcement drift anomaly. (Kothari 2001.) 
The third reason why ERC is observed to be too small, can be explained by inadequate 
GAAP. This may result in a so called “low quality” earnings that are poorly correlated with 
the return of the share. In other words, there is a chance that the reported earnings by 
companies are not completely substantial. As the fourth hypothesis, one can consider so-
called temporary earnings. This means, for example, that companies may have large one-off 
transactions. Such actions have an impact on the company’s book values, which can make it 
difficult to evaluate ERC. (Kothari 2001.) 
ERC can be used for examining a profit warning, but when the impact of a profit warning on 
the company’s share is considered, the abnormal return of the share is often examined 
instead. This relationship between the share return and the profit warning is more generally 
studied using the event study methodology. The event study methodology is presented in 
chapter 6.3.1. 
 
5.2. Issuing of a voluntary profit warning 
 
Skinner (1994) points out in his research that a negative profit warning will cause a stronger 
reaction to the share price than a positive profit warning. He is particularly interested in why 
companies voluntarily publish negative or positive profit warnings. Skinner (1994) states that 
companies publish negative profit warnings to avoid possible legal costs. If a company 
reveals an extremely negative earnings report, there is a possibility that the company will be 
prosecuted because it has not published a profit warning. On the other hand, if a company 
reveals a particularly positive earnings report, no one is prosecuting the company even if it 
did not announce a profit warning. 
The reasons for publishing a positive or a negative profit warning can be quite different. The 
most important reason for publishing a negative profit warning is to avoid possible litigation. 
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A company may also publish a negative profit warning because, for example, it tries to 
improve its relations with the investors or because it tries to maintain its reputation. On the 
other hand, companies may publish positive profit warnings because they want to stand out 
from competitors. (Skinner 1994.) 
Skinner (1997) continues his earlier research and finds evidence that companies voluntarily 
publish unfavorable earnings announcements much more often than any other kind of 
earnings announcements. Moreover, he finds more evidence that potential legal costs affect 
the most on the decision of publishing a profit warning. He finds in his research that 
companies are more likely to publish a profit warning when there is a high chance of 
prosecution. Skinner (1997) finds that if a company has an ongoing lawsuit in the quarter, it 
is more likely to announce a profit warning. However, he notes that this evidence is 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that publishing a profit warning could avoid possible 
litigation. 
Kaznik & Lev (1995) investigate publications of voluntary profit warnings and the market 
reaction to these publications. They observe companies that released unexpected profits on 
the earnings announcement day. Kaznik et al. (1995) monitor the communication of these 
companies from the last 60 days before the announcement day. They find that about half of 
the companies do not warn about the profits in advance. Less than ten percent of the 
companies warn about the weakened performance by publishing quantitative information. 
The more negative the profit warning is, the more likely the company is to publish a profit 
warning and also provide more accurate quantitative information about its performance. In 
addition, Kasznik et al. (1995) find that a negative profit warning is more likely to be 
published than a positive profit warning.  
According to Kasznik et al. (1995), companies that publish a profit warning experience a 
greater reaction to their market value than those companies that decide to wait for the official 
earnings report date. Because of this reaction, Kasznik et al. (1995) rationalize the decision 
of companies to leave the profit warning unpublished. They find that companies publish 
profit warnings when the change in the performance is caused by permanent factors. If the 
negative performance is due to a random one-off factor, for example, a factor that affects 
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only one quarter, the odds are that the company is not going to publish a profit warning. 
Kothari, Shu & Wysocki (2009) also state that companies are reluctant to voluntarily publish 
negative information in advance. However, companies are generally happy to publish 
positive information beforehand. 
When it comes to issuing a profit warning, Kasznik et al. (1995) also report industry-specific 
differences. Especially high technology companies are more likely to publish negative profit 
warnings. High-tech companies are often riskier than other companies, which makes them 
more vulnerable to legal proceedings. This may be an explanation of why high-tech 
companies are publishing profit warnings more frequently. Regulated industries, such as the 
banking sector, publish profit warnings less frequently on average. One possible explanation 
for this is, for example, that such industries report about their performance and operations 
more than once in a quarter. Therefore, the information is not as unevenly distributed as in 
other industries. 
Kasznik et al. (1995) argue that a corporate structure also has an impact on how likely it is 
for a company to publish a profit warning. Issuance of negative profit warnings is affected 
by company size, previous forecasts, and if the company is operating in a high-tech industry. 
Issuance of a positive profit warning is not affected by the high-tech sector, but similar to a 
negative profit warning, it is affected by company size and previous forecasts. Large 
companies issue more profit warnings than small companies. One reason for this may be that 
large companies are more exposed to litigation than small companies. 
Soffer, Thiagarajan & Walther (2000) find that there are differences in how companies 
announce negative and positive profit warnings. When a company issues a negative profit 
warning, it publishes it with all possible information and leaves nothing untold. In the case 
of a positive profit warning, companies publish only a part of all possible information; some 
parts of the information are left for the official earnings report day. Soffer et al. (2000) note 
that the market seems to be more interested in the official earnings report. The pre-announced 
information does not seem to be as interesting as the official report. Because of this, 
companies publish all the negative information before the official day and only a portion of 
the positive information. Companies are trying to control the change in the share price which 
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is caused by the publication. However, the study states that the market seems to underreact 
to profit warnings, as the outcome of the official earnings report still significantly affects the 
share prices. 
Dayanandan, Donker & Karahan (2017) investigate the effect of issuing a profit warning on 
market liquidity. They discover that a company’s decision to issue a negative profit warning 
strengthens its liquidity after the announcement day. The negative profit warning reduces the 
uneven distribution of information, reduces the bid-ask-spread and increases the trading 
volume of the share. Therefore, it is possible to reduce the cost of capital by issuing a profit 
warning. If the economy is on a boom, issuing a profit warning will cause a bigger reaction 
to the share price. The study shows that although the reactions caused by a negative profit 
warning are generally negative, the company may experience a significant improvement in 
its liquidity when it issues the negative profit warning.  
Francoeur (2008) suggests that the management can decide to issue a profit warning for its 
own interest. The more the management owns the company’s shares, the less eager it is to 
issue a negative profit warning, as it would also cause a decrease in the value of their own 
investment. Francoeur (2008) also states that the management may issue a negative profit 
warning if it feels that the company’s share is too overvalued. If the management believes 
that analysts’ forecasts for the company are too optimistic, the management may issue a profit 
warning to curb this overvaluation. However, Francoeur (2008) states that if it is the market 
that has overestimated the share price, the management will not do anything about the 
situation. 
5.3. Markets’ reaction to profit warnings 
 
Jackson & Madura (2003a.) investigate the effect of negative profit warnings on the share 
return. They conclude that issuance of a negative profit warning causes a significant negative 
reaction to the return of the share. The abnormal return is found to be -10,75 percent on the 
announcement day. The study also reveals that the date of the announcement does not affect 
the abnormal return. It does not matter if a company announces the profit warning more than 
one month before the official earnings report day or if it announces it less than one month 
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before the official day. In both situations, the statistical impact on the share return is the same. 
However, smaller companies experience a larger reaction to their share price on the profit 
warning day than large companies. Smaller companies are followed less, which makes their 
announcements more surprising.  
Although the biggest reaction occurs on the day when the profit warning is announced, 
Jackson et al. (2003a.) find that the price of the share begins adjusting already five days 
before the announcement day. This may be due to a leak of insider information to the public 
or to the fact that the market has been able to predict the deteriorating situation, for example 
on the basis of the economic situation. Jackson et al. (2003a.) also argue that even though the 
return of the share experiences a major reaction on the day of the profit warning, the market 
still underreacts to it. Abnormal returns are generated even five days after the profit warning. 
During the period of five days before the profit warning and five days after the profit warning, 
the cumulative abnormal return is -21,69 percent. However, overall, the markets may 
overreact to profit warnings, as positive abnormal returns occur on days 11–60 after the profit 
warning. 
In their other study, Jackson & Madura (2003b.) investigate foreign shares listed in the 
United States, and how profit warnings affect such shares. Likewise, foreign companies also 
experience negative share returns on the day of the profit warning. On the profit warning day, 
the abnormal return is -6,47 percent. However, the cumulative abnormal return 10 days 
before the profit warning is found to be -4,61 percent. Jackson et al. (2003b.) argue that 
because of this, the markets are inefficient and insider information has been exploited by 
selling the shares in advance. 
Kasznik et al. (1995) state that the markets punish companies for openness. Tucker (2007) 
finds results that strengthen this claim. Companies that decide to publish a profit warning 
experience a greater shock to their share return than companies that decide to wait for the 
official earnings report day. These findings hold even between companies with a similar risk 
profile. However, Tucker (2007) reminds that companies which publish a profit warning have 
more negative information to offer to the market than those companies which wait for the 
official day. Share returns are found to be 10,1 percent lower on average for those companies 
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that publish a profit warning. However, Tucker (2007) finds evidence that, after all, the 
markets do not punish more companies that announce a profit warning; when the research 
period is increased to three months, the difference in share returns disappears. 
Xu (2008) also investigates differences between companies that decide to issue a profit 
warning and companies that decide to wait for the official earnings report day. He also finds 
that the markets punish more those companies that issue profit warnings. However, Xu’s 
(2008) results do not provide evidence that the markets would overreact to profit warnings. 
When companies that publish profit warnings are compared to companies that do not publish 
them, it is noticed that during several different longer time periods, abnormal returns of these 
companies are not significantly different. 
Tawatnuntachai & Yaman (2007) study what kind of a reaction issuing a profit warning 
causes to the company’s share price and enterprise value. Similar to other studies, they also 
find that a negative profit warning causes a strong negative reaction to the share price. 
Furthermore, companies that warn about the deteriorating performance in advance 
experience a stronger reaction than those companies that do not warn in advance. However, 
according to the study, this difference does not mean market overreaction. Although the price 
of the share falls fiercely, there are no significant differences between the two choices when 
enterprise value or operational performance are considered. Whether the company issues a 
profit warning or waits for the earnings report day, in the long run, there are no significant 
differences observed in the returns of the shares either.  
Tawatnuntachai et al. (2007) argue that the strong reaction in the share price on the day of 
the profit warning is not a sign of overreaction, but rather a sign of investors’ change of 
perception of the company’s long-term performance. Therefore, the authors conclude that the 
decision of issuing a profit warning is irrelevant to the share return in the long run. 
Bulkey & Herrerias (2005) distribute negative profit warnings to qualitative and quantitative 
profit warnings. A qualitative profit warning refers to an announcement where the company 
bluntly states that earnings forecasts will not be reached. A quantitative profit warning means 
more accurate information about the company’s earnings and often the company provides 
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corrections to earlier forecasts. Both types yield negative abnormal returns, but qualitative 
profit warnings cause much greater reaction than quantitative profit warnings. Qualitative 
profit warnings result in a 9,6 percent negative cumulative abnormal return over a three-
month period, whereas quantitative profit warnings yield only a -2,2 percent cumulative 
abnormal return. It can be concluded that the market responds more strongly to vague 
information. 
Quantitative and qualitative profit warnings are observed to affect share returns of small 
companies significantly more strongly than large companies. Furthermore, growth 
companies are found to respond slightly more to profit warnings than value companies, but 
this difference is not statistically significant. According to the study, the market is 
underreacting to profit warnings, as abnormal returns also occur several days after the profit 
warning. (Bulkey et al. 2005.) 
Cox, Dayanandan & Donker (2016) study how a company’s decision to issue a profit warning 
affects other companies in the same industry that do not publish any foreknowledges. They 
find that profit warnings in the same industry also affect those companies that do not issue 
profit warnings. The profit warning is considered to bring more information to the market 
about the whole industry, which also affects the returns of the shares of other companies in 
the same industry. How strongly the companies that do not issue profit warnings are affected 
by those companies’ decisions that do announce profit warnings, is depended on the general 
economic situation. The effect on other companies is positively correlated with the general 
economic situation; during a boom the effect is larger and during a contraction the effect is 
smaller. In addition, Cox et al. (2016) find that domestic companies experience a greater 
movement in the share return than international companies. 
Using the Fama & French three-factor model, Cox, Dayanandan, Donker & Nofsinger (2017) 
investigate U.S. listed companies that have issued profit warnings during 1995–2012. They 
find that a negative profit warning causes a -13,38 percent abnormal return on the day of 
announcement. Furthermore, the cumulative abnormal return 30 days before the 
announcement day is -5,27 percent. On this basis, they interpret that insider information has 
leaked to the market or the market has anticipated the profit warning. The market has begun 
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to adjust to the situation even before the publication of profit warning. However, the market 
does not adjust strongly enough, as on the announcement day, the return of the share still 
experiences a strong reaction. 
Cox et al. (2017) also find that the markets punish companies for their openness. Issuance of 
a profit warning results in a higher negative abnormal return when compared to a situation 
where the company waits for the official earnings report day. Companies that do not publish 
profit warnings experience only an abnormal return of -1,17 percent on the earnings report 
date.  
Cox et al. (2017) continue their research by examining whether the general economic 
situation has any effect on the reaction caused by a profit warning. They find that if the 
economy is in recession, profit warnings do not cause as strong reactions as in boom. If the 
economy is in recession, bad news are not as surprising, which means that the price of the 
share will not fluctuate so strongly. 
Cox et al. (2017) argue that companies have an opportunity to disclose the negative 
information prematurely or to wait for the earnings report day. They note that even though a 
disclosure of negative information in advance may be justifiable for example due to legal 
obligations, it is worth considering the significant negative reaction to the company’s share 
price. According to their research, when the economy is in recession, the markets do not 
respond as strongly to profit warnings. Therefore, it may be more profitable to issue a profit 
warning when the economy is in recession. 
Spohr (2014) investigates profit warnings in different Nordic countries; Finland, Sweden, 
Denmark and Iceland in 2005–2011. First, he finds that the data set is clearly skewed towards 
Finland, as over 70 percent of all profit warnings are from Finland. Alves, Pope & Young 
(2009) also find that Finnish companies tend to issue profit warnings more frequently than 
other European companies. Spohr (2014) finds that on the day of the profit warning, the 
abnormal return for positive warnings is 4,8% and for negative ones it is -6,1 percent. 
Interestingly, abnormal returns continue to be significant four days after the profit warning. 
However, this is true only for negative warnings, as the abnormal return from positive profit 
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warnings is significant only on the announcement day. Spohr (2014) also finds evidence that 
the market response is bigger if the warning is issued by a high-risk company and if the 
issuance comes as a surprise to the market. 
 
5.4. Seasonal Affective Disorder and financial markets 
 
Kamstra et al. (2003) are the first to document the relation between SAD and stock returns. 
Before this study, the closely related literature is by Saunders (1993), who examines the 
effect of sunshine on stock markets. As the amount of sunshine is factored by the amount of 
cloud cover and number of hours of daylight, Saunders (1993) uses these to find a positive 
correlation between the amount of sunshine and stock returns. Later, Hirshleifer & Shumway 
(2003) provide more evidence from 26 different stock markets and find results similar to 
Saunders’ (1993) study. 
Kamstra et al. (2003) investigate four stock indexes in the U.S. and eight indexes from all 
over the world, including northern markets in Sweden and southern markets in Australia. Just 
by looking at the average returns, the conclusion is clear for all the indexes; returns are low 
in early autumn and at their lowest in September. Autumn is followed by higher returns as 
days begin to lengthen. To capture the SAD effect from this finding, Kamstra et al. (2003) 
use standard approximations from spherical trigonometry. This methodology is presented in 
chapter 6.3.2. SAD is found to be statistically significant in all studied countries. 
Furthermore, the farther away the county is from the equator, the stronger and more 
significant the SAD variable is. They are also able to find that investors try to avoid risky 
investments during the fall. Consistent with the SAD-induced seasonal pattern in returns, 
investors are found to resume their risky holdings in the winter. In other words, when the 
amount of daylight is decreasing, investors become more risk averse. When the amount of 
daylight starts to increase towards the winter, investors start to see “light at the end of the 
tunnel” and they become less risk averse, i.e. they resume their risky investments. 
Using these findings, Kamstra et al. (2003) illustrate a trading strategy that could have been 
used during 1980–2010. They compare two different portfolios: a neutral portfolio and a 
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SAD portfolio. The neutral portfolio consists of 50/50 allocation between the Swedish index 
and the Australian index. The SAD portfolio is formed by reallocating 100 percent of the 
portfolio between the Swedish and Australian index. The investor puts her money in the 
Swedish market during the Northern Hemisphere’s fall and winter and shifts the investment 
to Australian markets during the Southern Hemisphere’s fall and winter. Using this strategy, 
the investor gains 7,9 percent higher return compared to the first strategy.  
Kaplanski, Levy, Veld & Veld-Merkoulova (2015) conduct a survey in Netherlands and 
study approximately 5 000 households. Their analyses are based on 1 465 questionnaires 
done by individual investors. They find that positive investor sentiment is positively 
correlated with higher expected returns and lower expected risk. Moreover, they find that 
SAD also affects return expectations, as SAD is found to be correlated with mood. They 
conclude that SAD is an important factor in forming subjective expectations. Consistent with 
prior studies, Kaplanski et al. (2015) find that SAD sufferers have low expected returns in 
autumn. 
Garret, Kamstra & Kramer (2005) use a conditional version of the CAPM to capture the 
effect of SAD. Their model allows the price of risk to vary over time. Using a daily and 
monthly market data from several countries: the U.S., Japan, the UK, Sweden, New Zealand 
and Australia, they are able to detect the SAD effect. Furthermore, they state that their model 
is able to capture the SAD effect completely. They conclude their study stating that SAD 
might be a natural coincidence of changes in risk aversion over time. 
Kamstra, Kramer & Levi (2015) study U.S. Treasuries and try to find if more evidence 
supporting SAD could be found. Naturally, if investors indeed approach less risky assets in 
autumn, because of heightened risk aversion, U.S. Treasuries would be a clear choice, as they 
are generally thought to be the risk-free asset. Kamstra et al. (2015) study seasonal changes 
in the returns of U.S. Treasuries. They find that monthly returns are approximately 80 basis 
points higher in October than in April. They elaborate that this difference is economically 
and statistically highly significant. They control for various factors, for example, 
macroeconomic cycles, employment turnover, stock market volatility, FOMC announcement 
cycle and the Fama-French momentum factors, and find that none of these are able to explain 
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a notable proportion of the seasonality in returns. The only model that explains this is the 
model that has a proxy for seasonal variation in risk aversion. This model explains over 60 
percent of the swing in returns. 
Dolvin, Pyles & Wu (2009) study effects of SAD to stock market analysts. Optimism and 
pessimism of analysts’ estimates is widely studied subject. However, the conclusion can be 
viewed as controversial, even though the analysts’ bias is widely accepted in the literature. 
Some studies (see, for example, Brown & Rozeff 1978; Lim 2001; Hilary & Menzly 2005) 
state that analysts are too optimistic in their estimates whereas some studies (see, for 
example, Brown 2001; Matsumoto 2002; Richardson, Teoh & Wysocki 2004) find increasing 
pessimism. Dolvin et al. (2009) find evidence that analysts’ degree of pessimism increases 
during fall and winter. The results are especially strong for states located in the North where 
SAD is found to be more prevailing. They suggest that the increased pessimism caused by 
SAD, offsets the existing positive bias. So, as a result, they conclude that SAD makes analyst 
estimates more accurate as a whole. 
Dolvin & Pyles (2007) investigate if SAD affects pricings of initial public offerings (IPOs). 
The authors collect data of issued IPOs during 1986–2000. They find evidence that 
companies that decide to go public in the fall and winter, must offer their shares at a lower 
price. The reason for this is that as investors are affected by SAD, their risk aversion is 
increased and demand is lowered. Therefore, companies must offer their shares at a lower 
price to induce investors. However, even though they expect to find an asymmetric effect 
around the winter solstice, they are not able to find any evidence of this. In other words, they 
are not able to prove that underpricing is more prevalent during the fall months than during 
the winter months. However, they do find evidence that offer price revisions are increased 
especially during the winter months. This is consistent with the SAD hypothesis; investors’ 
emotions are becoming more positive, as days begin to lengthen.  
Kliger, Gurevich & Haim (2012) challenge the efficient market theory on chronological 
grounds. As the efficient market theory states that investors act rationally, Kliger et al. (2012) 
also find that SAD affects pricings of IPOs. The authors investigate the short and the long-
run performance of IPOs. In the short run, IPOs issued during shortening days (depressive 
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days) generated less returns than IPOs issued during lengthening days (cheerful days). This 
is consistent with the study of Dolvin et al. (2007). When returns are examined in the long-
run (1.5–3 years), the authors find that excess returns of IPOs issued during the cheerful days 
revert to the grand mean of returns of IPOs. Nevertheless, the initial difference in returns 
between IPOs issued during the cheerful and depressive days is 5–10 percent of the offering. 
If the company is publicly less exposed, this difference increases as high as up to 15–25 
percent. 
Dolvin & Fernhaber (2014) continue the investigation of IPOs and SAD. Similarly to prior 
studies, they find that SAD affects pricings of IPOs. More importantly, they find evidence 
that especially younger companies are affected by SAD. This finding is consistent with the 
study of Kliger et al. (2012), as one can interpret younger companies as publicly less exposed. 
Even though Dolvin et al. (2014) find that SAD influences IPO underpricing, they state that 
using a high-quality underwriter or changing the share retention decision can be used to 
reduce the causation. 
Kamstra et al. (2017) find evidence of seasonality in investors’ risk aversion. They 
investigate the money flow between mutual fund categories and find that investors prefer 
same mutual funds in autumn and risky funds in spring. The authors document that this 
finding is correlated with seasonality in investors’ risk aversion, which is affected by SAD. 
Kaustia & Rantapuska (2015) challenge the prior literature that claims that weather and 
length of day affects stock returns. They study these factors in Finland, which should offer a 
great opportunity to study this causality, as weather and length of day have significant 
variation in Finland. The authors have massive data set of account level stock trading data 
from January 1995 through November 2002. Their final data includes 1,2 million individual 
investors, 45 000 institutions and 13 million trades. The authors cannot find any statistical 
significance of sunniness or temperature, but find that precipitation is economically and 
statistically highly significant. Furthermore, they find little evidence that SAD affects to 
tendency to buy versus sell. However, they find that SAD might have a positive effect on the 
volume of trade.  
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Kaustia et al. (2015) state that they do not find any clear seasonal patterns that are originated 
from environmental mood variables. However, they do find a pattern that seems to correlate 
with holiday seasons. They find that investors trade less during the holiday season and tend 
to sell their investments prior the holiday. They argue that vacation-related consumption 
could be a lucid explanation to this. This finding is consistent with the Halloween effect. 
Lin (2015) studies the effects of SAD on quarterly earnings announcements in the U.S. 
markets. Lin (2015) documents evidence that during the SAD months, the immediate reaction 
to earnings announcements is lower. Furthermore, PEAD is found to be higher during the 
SAD months. This is explained by the fact that due to an increased risk aversion, investors 
tend to react slowly. The immediate reaction is asymmetric; in the fall, the SAD effect is 
stronger than in winter. Interestingly, Lin (2015) does not find evidence that this kind of 
asymmetry prevails in the case of PEAD. She also reports differences in positive and negative 
earnings announcements. SAD is found to have an immediate influence on positive earnings 
announcements, but in the case of negative earnings, there is no statistically significant 
difference in returns between the SAD season and other seasons. 
Lin (2015) argues that the direction of earnings announcements is important. The immediate 
reaction to positive earnings announcements is smaller during the SAD seasons, as investors 
are more risk averse. However, she does not find evidence that SAD affects the immediate 
reaction to negative earnings announcements. She argues that this is due to the ostrich effect. 
The ostrich effect is a human tendency to pretend that negative or uncomfortable information 
does not exist. Lin (2015) argues that during the SAD season, people are more likely to 
alleviate cognitive dissonance by actively avoiding information that could increase the 
dissonance.  
Lin (2015) also investigates abnormal trading volumes and finds that the three-day abnormal 
volume is lower in the fall for positive earnings announcements. Investors are found to be 
more risk averse and less willing to trade even when positive information is released. When 
the daylight starts to increase, trading volumes also increase. The SAD effect is asymmetric; 
investors trade less in the fall than in the winter. Lin (2015) notes that these findings hold 
only when positive earnings announcements are considered. The same argument for the 
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ostrich effect is given. Moreover, she finds that the SAD effect is more prevailing in stocks 
that investors are more interested in. This kind of salience is proxied by firm size, age, 
turnover and number of analyst recommendations. 
Even though several studies have found SAD affecting financial markets, there are also 
researchers who criticize these studies. The main point of critique is that even if a seasonal 
effect is documented, it does not necessarily mean that the effect is caused by SAD.  
Kelly & Meschke (2010) extend and replicate the study of Kamstra et al. (2003). They show 
that the SAD hypothesis is not supported by psychological or econometric literature. They 
state that SAD does not affect stock returns. They argue that that the SAD effect is only a 
“turn-of-year” effect. Furthermore, they claim that the SAD model has econometric problems 
in it; according to their study, the SAD model mechanically induces the statistical 
significance of the SAD variable. Kelly et al. (2010) conclude that the medical or 
psychological evidence is not sufficient to state the causation between the SAD effect and 
investor sentiment.  
Because of the accusations of Kelly et al. (2010), Kamstra, Kramer & Levi (2012) re-examine 
the causation of the SAD effect and stock returns. Kamstra et al. (2012) shred the study of 
Kelly et al. (2010), stating that they misinterpret their empirical results, ignore several 
coefficient-estimates that clearly support the SAD hypothesis, and in the end, only interrupt 
legitimate scientific research. According to Kelly et al. (2010), the SAD effect is no different 
from a “turn-of-year” effect. Kamstra et al. (2012) remind that the original study of Kamstra 
et al. (2003) specifically controls for such “turn-of-year” effects. Furthermore, as Kamstra et 
al. (2012) study the data of Kelly et al. (2009), they find statistically significant results that 
clearly support the SAD hypothesis. Lastly, Kamstra et al. (2012) state that Kelly et al. (2010) 
misrepresent the finance, psychology and medical literatures, choosing selective quotes that 
can easily misguide readers.  
Jacobsen & Marquering (2008) also challenge the study by Kamstra et al. (2003). They do 
find strong evidence of seasonality in stock returns, but state that the evidence to conclude 
that SAD is the reason for this, is not sufficient. The authors argue that other variables with 
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a seasonal pattern can be used to explain the change in returns in the fall and the winter. For 
example, the Halloween indicator seems to explain these returns better than the SAD 
variable. The main argument is that Kamstra et al. (2003) cannot conclude that the SAD 
effect is responsible for the change in investors’ risk aversion. Moreover, as there is also 
contrary evidence that people in good moods become more risk averse and people in sad 
moods become less risk averse (see Parker & Tavassoli 2000), Jacobsen et al. (2008) argue 
that the evidence supporting the SAD hypothesis is not adequate.  
Jacobsen et al. (2008) argue that there is no reason for complex trigonometry to calculate the 
SAD variable, as a simple seasonal dummy variable would be a better choice. Kamstra, 
Kramer & Levi (2009) publish a comment for study of Jacobsen et al. (2008). Kamstra et al. 
(2009) state that there are several methodological problems in the study of Jacobsen et al. 
(2008). Kamstra et al. (2009) are not able to replicate the findings of Jacobsen et al. (2008), 
and note that there are misspecifications in their econometric model. However, even though 
Kamstra et al. (2009) agree that SAD might not be an explanation for all variation in equity 
markets, they state that the economically and statistically significant results of the original 
study by Kamstra et al. (2003) still hold.  
Jacobsen & Marquering (2009) response to the comment by Kamstra et al. (2009). They note 
that Kamstra et al. (2009) miss the main point of their paper; that several things are correlated 
with the well-known summer-winter pattern in stock returns and it is difficult to recognize 
what exactly is causing this pattern. Jacobsen et al. (2009) claim that the evidence of Kamstra 
et al. (2009) is not convincing and that they just assume that it is the SAD causing the pattern. 
Jacobsen et al. (2009) show that they can explain the pattern by ice cream consumption or 
airline travel. Therefore, Jacobsen et al. (2009) conclude that there is not enough evidence to 
state that the SAD effect is influencing stock returns. Because of these controversial thoughts, 
a further investigation of the SAD effect is needed. 
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6. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The used data, research hypotheses, and methodology are presented in this chapter. Briefly, 
the data consists of Finnish stock return data of companies who have issued profit warnings 
during 2011–2017 and the actual profit warnings announcements. In addition, several control 
variables are used in the regression analysis. The research hypotheses are presented at the 
end of this chapter. Lastly, in chapter 6.3., the methodology used to study these hypotheses 
is presented. 
 
6.1. Data description 
 
This study uses profit warnings issued by Finnish companies during the period 2011 to 2017. 
Profit warnings are gathered by hand from NASDAQ OMX Central Storage Facility (CSF) 
using several different keywords, for example, announce, outlook, profit warning, guidance, 
change and profit. Using these and other keywords, approximately 9 800 announcements 
were reviewed, and finally 354 profit warnings were selected.  
An announcement is defined as a profit warning, if certain qualities are fulfilled. First of all, 
the announcement must report about a significant change in the company’s expected earnings 
or financial performance. Moreover, the announcement must be a separate stock exchange 
announcement. Any foreknowledge given in an interim report, financial statement, or with 
any other significant event, has not been included as a profit warning. If a company issues an 
announcement about changing its long-term strategy or updates its long-term financial goals, 
such announcements are not included as profit warnings. Announcement about nonrecurring 
items can be defined as a profit warning only if the company clearly states that these items 
will affect its earlier guidance. If a company issues an announcement where it states that the 
company maintains its guidance despite difficult financial times, I have not included such 
announcements as profit warnings. Any announcement about change in equity or share issues 
are not taken into account. 
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It is worth noting that it is not always distinct if an announcement is a profit warning or not. 
When choosing if an announcement can be included in the material, it is often required to 
check the company’s earlier announcements about its earlier guidance. Moreover, some 
profit warnings are omitted from the material because of lack of trading or lack of return data. 
Shares that constantly trade at less than 1 euro are omitted from the material. It is notable 
that in Finnish stock market several companies with a share value of less than 1 euro have 
issued especially negative profit warnings. The final number of profit warnings used in the 
study is 286. These profit warnings are listed in Appendix 1. 
The data consists of 102 positive profit warnings and 184 negative profit warnings. Figure 3 
shows how negative and positive profit warnings are scattered around the year. Most of the 
profit warnings are announced in October and January. One explanation for the high number 
of warnings in October can be that announcement of Q3 earnings reports is close. In January, 
the financial statements or Q4 earnings reports are usually disclosed. The lowest amount of 
warnings is in May. Once again, the cycle of quarters can explain this. Most of the profit 
warnings regarding Q1 earnings report are already announced in April. 
 
Figure 3. Positive and negative profit warnings on a monthly basis. 
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Table 1 shows the distribution of negative and positive profit warnings used in the study in 
more detail. Over 50 percent of the profit warnings are announced during the SAD season, 
i.e. during the fall and winter. Furthermore, there are more profit warnings announced in the 
fall than during the winter. If investors’ risk aversion is heightened during the SAD season, 
it might be beneficial for companies to announce their negative profit warnings especially in 
the fall and positive profit warnings during the spring and summer. 
 
Table 1. Distribution of positive and negative profit warnings to SAD season, non-SAD 
season, Fall, non-Fall and Winter.  
Panel A: SAD and non-SAD   
  SAD Non-SAD Total 
Negative 101 83 184 
Positive 53 49 102 
Total 154 132 286 
      
Panel B: Fall and non-Fall   
  Fall Non-Fall Total 
Negative 64 120 184 
Positive 25 77 102 
Total 89 197 286 
      
Panel C: Fall and Winter   
  Fall Winter Total 
Negative 64 37 101 
Positive 25 28 53 
Total 89 65 154 
 
Daily stock return data and control variables for regressions are obtained from Datastream 
and EPS estimates from I/B/E/S. Figure 4 shows how indexes OMXH and OMXHCAP have 
developed during 2010–2017. OMXH indicates the overall performance of all shares listed 
in the stock exchange. OMXHCAP also indicates the overall performance of all shares listed 
in the stock exchange, but one stock cannot have a weight more than ten percent. For 
example, during the best days of Nokia Plc, OMXH was strongly correlated with the 
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development of Nokia Plc’s share price. This is the main reason why OMXHCAP is used as 
the reference index in this study. Moreover, the use of value-weighted index is common in 
prior literature. The used index is a return index, i.e. it includes dividends. 
 
 
Figure 4. Returns of OMXH and OMXHCAP return indexes during 2010–2017. 
 
Kamstra et al. (2003) assume in their study that winter solstice takes place on the 21st of 
December and summer solstice on the 21st of June. They also note that the actual timing can 
vary by a couple of days. Kamstra et al. (2003) and Lin (2015) define fall as 21st of September 
to 20th of December and winter as 21st of December to 21st of March. I also follow these 
definitions in my study. 
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6.2. Hypotheses 
 
The main part of interest of this thesis is to examine the possible effects of SAD to profit 
warnings. However, also market reactions to profit warnings are examined. The reason for 
this is to provide a deeper understanding of profit warnings. Tests related to profit warnings 
can be seen as a supplemental information about the phenomenon. However, reviewing the 
market reaction to profit warnings helps to understand the magnitude of the event, but also 
how long it takes for markets to react. Furthermore, if the abnormal returns are found to be 
insignificant, one can argue that it is unreasonable to test how SAD affects the immediate 
reaction to profit warnings. A brief analysis of the abnormal returns also reinforces the 
descriptive statistics.  
As profit warning offers new information for the market and can happen unexpectedly, I 
expect to see abnormal returns on the day of the profit warning. This leads to the first 
hypothesis: 
H1: An announcement of profit warning generates abnormal returns on the day of the 
announcement.  
Jackson et al. (2003a.) find that abnormal returns are generated even before the profit 
warning. This means that the market anticipates the profit warning. To examine this 
possibility, I investigate the second hypothesis.  
H2: The market anticipates the profit warning and abnormal returns are generated a few 
days before the announcement. 
Jackson et al. (2003a.) also find that abnormal returns are generated even five days after the 
profit warning. This suggests that the market has difficulties in determining the magnitude 
of the profit warning. Because of this reason, I examine the third hypothesis. 
H3: Abnormal returns continue generating after the announcement, as the market cannot 
assimilate the information quickly enough. 
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Because SAD sufferers’ risk aversion increases during the SAD season, they tend to be more 
careful about their investment decisions. This should lead to a smaller immediate reaction to 
profit warnings during the SAD season. Reviewing the results of Lin (2015), I expect to find 
a significantly smaller immediate reaction to positive profit warnings in the fall. However, 
because of the ostrich effect, I do not expect to find a significant difference when negative 
profit warnings are examined. The ostrich effect refers to investors’ tendency to avoid bad 
news. To avoid an exposure to bad news, investors pretend that the news do not exist. Prior 
studies have used the ostrich effect as an explanation for such results. For example, Galai & 
Sade (2006) explain differences in returns in the fixed income market with the ostrich effect. 
Moreover, Karlsson et al. (2009) also find evidence supporting the ostrich effect. As profit 
warnings are very similar to earnings announcements, I expect to find results similar to Lin 
(2015). This leads to the fourth hypothesis.  
 
H4: Because of seasonal affective disorder, the immediate reaction to positive profit 
warnings is smaller during the SAD season, but there is no significant difference for 
negative profit warnings between SAD and non-SAD seasons. 
 
According to Kamstra et al. (2003), investors who are affected by SAD can behave 
differently in the fall months versus the winter months. Even though the amount of daylight 
is low in the winter, its length is increasing. As the amount of daylight starts to increase after 
the winter solstice, investors’ risk aversion should start to decrease, i.e. investors are more 
willing to take risks and trade more. Therefore, the PEAD should be larger during the SAD 
season than during the non-SAD season, when the amount of daylight might be decreasing. 
Furthermore, as the amount of daylight increases towards the spring, the PEAD should be 
higher during the winter than during the fall. This conjecture signifies an asymmetric effect 
in SAD. I examine these possibilities with the following hypotheses:  
 
H5: Because of seasonal affective disorder, the PEAD is larger during the SAD season. 
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H6: SAD has an asymmetric effect, which leads to a smaller immediate reaction to profit 
warnings in the fall and higher magnitude of PEAD in the winter. 
 
6.3. Methodology 
 
Methodology, i.e. methods used to study hypotheses, are presented in this chapter. First, it is 
examined if profit warnings generate abnormal returns around the announcement day. After 
examining the abnormal returns, it is studied if the SAD effect affects those returns.  
Daily returns of shares are calculated in the following way: 
(5)  𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ln(𝑃𝑖𝑡) − ln (𝑃𝑖𝑡−1) 
where  Rit = return of a share on day t 
  ln(Pit) = natural logarithm of a share’s closing price 
  ln(Pit-1) = natural logarithm of a share’s closing price on day t-1. 
When calculating daily returns of the index, R is the return of the index and P is the closing 
price of the index. 
The rest of the chapter is formed in the following way. First, the event study methodology 
which is used to study abnormal returns of profit warnings is presented. Second, the 
methodology to study the SAD effect, the so-called sine wave measure, is presented. Lastly, 
regression equations used in this study are discussed in detail. 
 
6.3.1. Event study methodology 
 
Event studies are used to measure the impact of various market incidents. In this study, event 
study methodology is used to measure the impact of profit warnings to companies’ stock 
prices. The method is based on the assumptions that markets function rationally, and the 
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information is correctly and instantly reflected to the prices. Event studies are a common 
approach to examine abnormal returns. (MacKinlay 1997.) 
To conduct an event study, first it is needed to specify the event that is to be examined. Next, 
one must specify the period over which the security prices of the firms involved in the event 
will be examined. This time interval is called an event window. It is common to determine 
the event window to begin already before the realization of the studied event and to continue 
after the event. This way it is possible to detect the price movements before and after the 
event. Therefore, it allows a possibility to observe how quickly markets react. To calculate 
abnormal returns, an estimation period must be specified. To make sure that the event does 
not affect expected returns, it is essential that estimation period does not overlap with the 
event window. (MacKinlay 1997.) 
Figure 5 summarizes the event study methodology and shows the estimation period and 
estimation window used in this study. 
 
  
 
      
 
  
          
                    
                 
 Estimation Period    Event Window   
 
Figure 5. Event windows and estimation period used in the study. 
T0 denotes the announcement day of the profit warning. Following Lin (2015), the estimation 
period is one-year period from date -270 to -21. This study uses a few different event 
windows between days -5 and +50 to study the evolution of abnormal returns around the 
profit warning day. Even though the main interest is in the SAD effect, it is essential to 
understand how prices behave around profit warnings. Event windows (-1, +1) and (+2, +50) 
are used to study the SAD effect. The three-day window measures the SAD effects on 
immediate response to profit warnings and the longer event window measure the SAD effects 
on the PEAD. Because of data, program and labor limitations, I use event window (+2, +50) 
T0 T-5 T-21 T-270 T+5 T+50 
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instead of (+2, +61) that Lin (2015) uses. However, referring to findings of Bernard et al. 
(1989), it is unlikely that the absent 11 days are highly relevant, especially when explaining 
the relation between SAD and PEAD. 
Abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are defined using the 
event study methodology. There are several options to calculate abnormal returns 
(MacKinlay 1997). I follow Lin (2015) and use the market model to estimate the abnormal 
returns. Abnormal returns are defined as the difference between the realized return and the 
expected return: 
(6)  𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑡). 
The market model is defined as  
(7)  𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 , 
where  E(Rit) = expected return of a share on day t 
  αi = estimated constant 
  βi = estimated market beta for a share 
  Rmt = market return on day t. 
  
The market model assumes a linear relationship between the stock return and the market 
return. In this study, the market return is given by the OMXHCAP index. When the expected 
return is calculated, the abnormal return can be calculated as it is shown in Equation 6. 
(MacKinaly 1997.) 
When the daily returns of a share from a certain period are summed together, one achieves 
the cumulative abnormal return. This can be expressed in the following way: 
(8)  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡1𝑡0) =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑇1
𝑇0
.  
Daily average abnormal return (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) are 
simply achieved by taking the arithmetic mean of all abnormal returns or all cumulative 
abnormal returns of the observations. The statistical significance of AARs and CAARs are 
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studied using the two-sided t-test. The abnormal returns are expected to be normally 
distributed. 
6.3.2. Measuring Seasonal Affective Disorder 
 
SAD is linked to the daylight in the sense of length of day. Length of day is depended on 
season and latitude. According to prior studies (see Molin et al. 1996; Schwarz et al. 1983; 
Young et al. 1997), SAD rises an individual’s risk aversion when the daylight is at its lowest, 
i.e. during the fall and winter.  
Following Kamstra et al. (2003), SAD is measured based on the number hours between 
sunset and sunrise. As SAD is prevalent only during the fall and winter, the SAD variable 
has values different from zero only during the fall and winter. To obtain values for the SAD 
variable, standard approximations from spherical trigonometry are needed. This method is 
called the sine wave measure. 
As Kamstra et al. (2003) demonstrate, the first step is to define juliant as number of the day 
in the year. This variable takes values ranging from 1 to 365 and to 366 in a leap year. 
Meaning, the value for January 1st is 1, for January 2nd 2, and so on. Next, the sun’s 
declination angle λt is calculated: 
(9)  λ𝑡 = 0,4102 ∗ sin[(
2𝜋
360
)(𝑗𝑢𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑡 − 80,25)] . 
After the declination angle of the sun has been calculated, the number of hours of night in 
the Northern Hemisphere is obtained by 
(10)  𝐻𝑡 = 24 − 7,72 ∗ arccos [− tan (
2𝜋δ
360
) tan (λ𝑡)], 
where arccos is the arc cosine and δ is the latitude, which is 60.19 in Helsinki. (Kamstra et 
al. 2003.)  
After calculating Ht, I then deduct 12 from it to obtain the length of night that is relative to 
the annual average length of night. Furthermore, following Kamstra et al. (2003), the SAD 
variable is specified only for trading days in the fall and winter: 
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(11)  𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 =  {
𝐻𝑡 − 12, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
. 
To examine the asymmetry explained with the Hypothesis 6, I follow Lin (2015) and generate 
two dummy variables, Fallt, which is equal to one if the profit warning is announced in the 
fall, and Wintert, which equals one if the profit warning is announced in the winter. 
Figure 6 illustrates the daily SAD measure around the year. The day of the winter solstice 
has the highest SAD value, as it is the shortest day of the year. After that, daylight starts to 
increase, and SAD sufferers start to recover. This means a lower value for the SAD variable.  
After September equinox, days start to shorten, and the SAD variable starts to have higher 
values. In other words, the SAD measure is negatively correlated with the amount of daylight. 
 
 
Figure 6. Daily SAD measure around the year. 
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Finally, the regression equation is defined in the following way: 
 (12)  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡(−1, +1) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑡 ∗
𝑆𝐴𝐷𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑃𝑖 +
𝛽8𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑊𝑖 +  𝜀. 
CARit(-1, +1) is the cumulative abnormal return over the three-day window centered on the 
profit warning date. When examining PEAD and the SAD effect, the dependent variable is 
changed to CARit(+2, +50). In addition, I also estimate the regression model with only SADt 
and the controls, i.e. without the fall and winter dummy variables to examine the SAD effect 
as a whole. To control for cross-sectional differences, several control variables are added to 
the equation. These variables are known to influence investors’ response to earnings 
surprises. Specifically, it is important to control for size (see, Hong, Lim & Teoh 2000) and 
market to book ratio (see, Hirshleifer, Lim & Teoh 2009).  
Sizeit is log of market capitalization of equity the day before the profit warning, MBit is 
market to book ratio the day before the profit warning, Betait is the beta from the market 
model, Reci is the consensus analyst recommendation on a scale from 1 to 5 (1 = strong buy 
and 5 = strong sell), EPi is the earnings-to-price multiple where the earnings is the consensus 
EPS estimate for the current financial year while price is the share price one day before the 
profit warning, and MultiWi is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the company has three 
or more profit warnings with the same sign during the observation period. I include the final 
four variables to follow findings of Spohr (2014). 
However, previous studies do not use that many independent variables when explaining 
abnormal returns of profit warnings. For example, Jackson et al. (2003a) use only the size 
variable and two different dummy variables that equal one when the company cites reduced 
revenue as the source of their profit warning and if the decline in earnings is expected to be 
major. Some studies, see for example Bartov, Radhakrishnan & Krinsky (2000), control for 
analyst coverage. However, as Hong et al. (2000) show, analyst coverage is strongly 
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correlated with firm size. Therefore, I control for size taking log of market capitalization of 
equity the day before the profit warning, as it is already highly correlated with analyst 
coverage. However, analyst recommendations may have a significant impact on the abnormal 
returns. Because of this, following Spohr (2014), I add analyst recommendations and EPS 
estimates as controlling variables. Furthermore, Chruch & Donker (2010) report that 
companies that announce profit warnings frequently have smaller responses to their 
warnings. For this reason, I also include the dummy variable MultiWi. 
Firm size is generally thought to be important to control for, as Jackson et al. (2003) and 
Church et al. (2010) show, the response decreases with the size of the company. However, 
Jackson et al. (2007) find that firm size nor analyst coverage have any impact. Bulkey et al. 
(2005) show that the market to book ratio does not have any significant impact on profit 
warnings, whereas Hirshleifer et al. (2009) show that it does affect investors’ response to 
earnings surprises. Because of this contradictory, I use several of these variables as control 
variables. Naturally, this also allows me to examine the contradictory of prior studies. 
However, the main interest is in the SAD variable. In other words, I include various control 
variables and examine if SAD variable is still significant even when several company 
specifications are controlled for. 
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7. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
This chapter reports the empirical results of the thesis. Negative and positive profit warnings 
are examined as separate portfolios; a negative portfolio and a positive portfolio. The chapter 
is formed according to the following. First, descriptive statistics for the entire sample are 
presented to provide general knowledge about the used data. Second, the results about market 
reactions to profit warnings are provided showing the AARs and CAARs, and their 
significance levels. Third, effects of SAD to profit warnings are examined on univariate level. 
Lastly, results of the regression analysis are discussed.   
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the entire sample. CAR(+1, +1) is three-day 
cumulative abnormal return around profit warning day (in percent) and CAR(+2, +50) is 
cumulative abnormal return over the window period between 2 days and 50 days after the 
profit warning day (in percent). Size, MB, Beta, Rec and EP are as defined in the earlier 
chapter. N is the number of observations and Stdev is the standard deviation. Min and Max 
are the smallest and highest values in the sample, respectively. 
Table 2. Summary statistics. 
Variables N Mean Stdev Median Min Max 
       
CAR(-1, +1) 286 -0,011 0,082 -0,006 -0,278 0,376 
CAR(+2, +50) 286 -0,014 0,124 -0,011 -0,396 0,320 
Size 286 5,406 1,794 5,478 1,428 9,979 
MB 286 2,030 1,669 1,460 -2,280 10,320 
Beta 286 0,588 0,435 0,460 -0,192 2,271 
Rec 286 2,450 1,273 2,610 1,000 5,000 
EP 286 6,134 13,589 1,418 -33,589 88,070 
 
The reason for negative means and medians for CARs might be because of higher number of 
negative profit warnings in the sample.  
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7.1. Market reaction to profit warnings 
 
Table 3 reports the AARs from the 11-day period. Specifically, Panel A shows the results of 
the negative portfolio and Panel B the results of the positive portfolio. Negative profit 
warning causes, on average, -3,7% abnormal return on the day of the announcement, which 
is also statistically highly significant. Furthermore, statistically significant abnormal returns 
occur also a day after the announcement and even a day after that. This implies that the market 
cannot assimilate all the information immediately and shows an underreaction by the market. 
If the market was efficient, abnormal returns should not occur after the announcement. This 
lagged reaction by the market is evidence against the efficient market hypothesis. As the 
returns continue being negative on the days one and two, it seems that the immediate reaction 
on the announcement day is not large enough. According to the efficient market hypothesis, 
all the information should be reflected into the prices immediately and correctly. Therefore, 
the immediate reaction should be higher and abnormal returns should not be statistically 
different from zero after the announcement.  
Positive profit warnings generate, on average, 5,4% abnormal return on the day of the 
announcement. Furthermore, the immediate reaction is more in line with the efficient market 
hypothesis, as there are no statistically significant abnormal returns on the days 1 and 2. 
However, on the days 3 and 4, there are abnormal returns that are statistically significant at 
10% level. Even though this significance is not the highest, it does raise interest. On the day 
3, the return is -0,39%, but on the following day it is 0,41%, which means that the cumulative 
price movement of these days is close to zero. The negative return on day 3 indicates that the 
market thinks that there might have been an overreaction. However, this thought is quickly 
buried, as on the next day the market concludes that the previous drop in price was not 
justifiable. However, in the end, the statistical significance of these returns is not high enough 
to make distinct conclusions.  
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Table 3. Market response to negative and positive profit warnings. The table shows abnormal 
returns five days prior profit warnings and five days after. Day 0 represents the day of an 
announcement. ***, ** and * represent statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
Panel A: Negative profit warnings 
    
Day AAR t-value  
-5 0,0005 0,33  
-4 0,0012 1,13  
-3 -0,0002 -0,12  
-2 0,0002 0,14  
-1 -0,0013 -0,73  
0 -0,0368 -9,01***  
1 -0,0106 -4,33***  
2 -0,004 -2,16**  
3 -0,0012 -0,59  
4 0,0004 0,20  
5 0,0009 0,52  
    
Panel B: Positive profit warnings 
    
Day AAR t-value  
-5 0,0009 0,57  
-4 0,0002 0,14  
-3 0,0011 0,72  
-2 0,0005 0,33  
-1 0,0006 0,31  
0 0,0535 10,95***  
1 0,0038 1,48  
2 0,0001 0,10  
3 -0,0039 -1,92*  
4 0,0041 1,95*  
5 0,0018 0,66  
    
 
To summarize Table 3, negative and positive profit warnings generate statistically significant 
abnormal returns on the day of the announcement. There is an underreaction to be seen in the 
case of negative profit warnings, as abnormal returns are generated even after the 
announcement. This is not true in the case of the positive portfolio, even though there is some 
trading to be observed on the days 3 and 4. Contradictory to prior studies, the immediate 
reaction to positive profit warnings is higher. Spohr (2014) reports similar results that 
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negative profit warnings cause abnormal returns even after the announcement day, but 
positive profit warnings do not. This indicates that the markets have difficulties to process 
negative information. This makes sense as negative news cause more uncertainty. Anyway, 
several prior studies about profit warnings tend to examine only negative profit warnings 
(Spohr 2014). So, there might not be enough studies about differences between positive and 
negative profit warnings.  
Table 3 supports Hypotheses 1 and 3, but not Hypothesis 2. As the abnormal returns are 
highly statistically significant on the announcement day, in both cases of negative and 
positive profit warnings, Hypothesis 1 can be accepted. Negative profit warnings show 
results that support Hypothesis 3, but positive profit warnings do not. Therefore, this 
hypothesis can be accepted partially, as the market is not able to assimilate the negative 
information quickly enough. On the contrary, the market absorbs the information from 
positive profit warning effectively. Therefore, these results suggest that the sign of the profit 
warning matters whether the market is able to react efficiently. Hypothesis 2 is not supported 
by these results. This means that the market does not anticipate the profit warning, as the 
study of Jackson et al. (2003a.) suggests. This finding supports the efficient market theory, 
whereas accepting Hypothesis 3, does not. 
Table 4 shows the cumulative average abnormal return from different event windows. Similar 
to Table 3, this table reports results of negative and positive profit warnings separately; Panel 
A shows the results of the negative portfolio and Panel B shows the results of the positive 
portfolio.  
Results of Table 4 strengthen the findings from Table 3. As it can be seen, the CAAR prior 
the profit warning is not statistically significant. The immediate reaction, CAAR(-1, +1), is 
statistically highly significant in both portfolios, as Table 3 suggests. Moreover, earlier 
findings gain support, as in the case of the negative portfolio, the CAAR(+1, +5) is 
statistically significant, but in the case of the positive portfolio, it is not. CAAR(-5, +5) is 
statistically significant in both portfolios, which highlights the effect of the profit warning 
announcement. Combining the findings from Table 3 and Table 4, Hypotheses 1 and 3 can 
be accepted, but Hypothesis 2 needs to be rejected.  
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Table 4. Cumulative abnormal returns of positive and negative profit warnings. The table 
shows various CAARs around the profit warning; showing cumulative average abnormal 
returns prior profit warnings, around the announcement day, and the PEAD. ***, ** and * 
represent statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Negative profit warnings 
   
  Return t-value 
CAAR(-5, -2) 0,0017 0,29 
CAAR(-1, +1) -0,0487 -9,97*** 
CAAR(-5, +5) -0,0508 -7,94*** 
CAAR(+1, +5) -0,0144 -4,00*** 
CAAR(+6, +11) -0,0052 -1,48 
CAAR (+6, +50) -0,0153 -1,71 
   
Panel B: Positive profit warnings 
   
  Return t-value 
CAAR(-5, -2) 0,0027 0,31 
CAAR(-1, +1) 0,0579 9,66*** 
CAAR(-5, +5) 0,0627 8,67*** 
CAAR(+1, +5) 0,0058 1,09 
CAAR(+6, +11) 0,0043 0,98 
CAAR (+6, +50) -0,0055 -0,51 
 
7.2. SAD and investors’ response to profit warnings 
 
As the used data is now described in detail, I move to examine the primary hypotheses of the 
study – does SAD affect the market response to profit warnings. Once again, I examine 
negative and positive profit warnings separately. Table 5 reports the univariate analyses 
showing the results for immediate reaction (-1, +1) and PEAD (+2, +50). Specifically, Panel 
A compares the mean returns of profit warnings announced during the SAD season, i.e. the 
fall and winter, against profit warnings announced during the spring and summer. Following 
(Lin 2015), I also divide the sample to test for differences between the fall season and non-
fall season (Panel B). To examine Hypothesis 6, I also compare the returns between the fall 
and winter (Panel C).  
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Reviewing the results of the immediate reaction first, as Table 5 Panel A shows, there is a 
highly statistically significant difference in the immediate reaction of positive profit warnings 
between the SAD season and non-SAD season. This finding supports the hypothesis that 
SAD causes heightened risk aversion and investors do not react as strongly to positive news 
during the SAD season. However, there is no difference in the case of negative profit 
warnings. These two findings are consistent with the study of Lin (2015). Lin (2015) 
proposes that the reason for insignificant difference in negative profit warnings is due to the 
ostrich effect, i.e. investors pretend that the negative news do not exist. Following Lin (2015), 
I follow this explanation as well. Panel B strengthens the SAD hypothesis, as returns in the 
fall are lower than during the rest of the year. Similarly, the difference is not significant in 
the case of the negative portfolio.  
Because the amount of daylight is increasing towards the spring, the PEAD should be higher 
during the SAD season versus the non-SAD season. As Panel A shows, this is indeed the 
case with the negative portfolio. However, there is no difference with positive profit 
warnings. Once again, Panel B strengthens this finding. However, Lin (2015) finds that the 
difference is significant also in the case of positive earnings announcements. This is another 
piece of evidence that negative and positive warnings might be treated differently. Moreover, 
the market might treat profit warnings and earnings announcements differently, and that can 
be an explanation for different results from Lin (2015).  
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Table 5. Univariate analyses: SAD effects on immediate response to positive and negative 
profit warnings and PEAD. The table shows three-day cumulative abnormal returns around 
profit warnings (CAR(-1, +1)) and the PEAD (CAR(+2, +50)) upon positive and negative 
profit warnings. Panel A compares the difference between SAD season and non-SAD season. 
Panel B is the difference between Fall and non-Fall season, and Panel C reports the difference 
between Fall and Winter. ***, ** and * represent statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: SAD and non-SAD       
      
  Average SAD Non-SAD Diff t-value 
CAR(-1, +1)     
Positive 0,0579 0,0419 0,0752 -0,0333 -2,87*** 
Negative -0,0487 -0,0407 -0,0539 0,0132 1,36 
      
CAR(+2, +50)     
Positive -0,0035 0,0048 -0,0126 0,0174 0,81 
Negative -0,0191 -0,0006 -0,0418 0,0412 2,05** 
      
Panel B: Fall and non-Fall       
      
  Average Fall Non-Fall Diff t-value 
CAR(-1, +1)     
Positive 0,0579 0,0324 0,0662 -0,0338 -2,48*** 
Negative -0,0487 -0,0381 -0,0512 0,0131 1,29 
      
CAR(+2, +50)     
Positive -0,0035 -0,0206 0,0020 -0,0226 -0,91 
Negative -0,0191 0,0062 -0,0327 0,0389 2,07** 
      
Panel C: Fall and Winter       
      
  Average Fall Winter Diff t-value 
CAR(-1, +1)     
Positive 0,0579 0,0324 0,0504 -0,018 -1,70* 
Negative -0,0487 -0,0381 -0,0452 0,0071 0,58 
      
CAR(+2, +50)     
Positive -0,0035 -0,0206 0,0275 -0,0481 -1,53 
Negative -0,0191 0,0062 -0,0123 0,0185 0,87 
            
 
Panel C examines Hypothesis 6; whether SAD has an asymmetric effect. The immediate 
reaction should be lower during the fall than winter and PEAD should be higher in the winter. 
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The only difference that is statistically significant is the immediate reaction to positive profit 
warnings, which is statistically significant at 10% level. Lin (2015) reports that there are no 
significant differences in the case of negative profit warnings. I observe the same. However, 
Lin (2015) finds that PEAD in the positive portfolio is statistically significant. As it can be 
seen, my t-value is only -1,53, which is not significant, but close being significant at 10%. 
However, the actual difference in returns is still almost 5%, which is economically highly 
significant. Nevertheless, the statistical evidence is low, and even though it might be because 
of the small sample size, Hypothesis 6 does not gain support. 
Table 5 provides support for Hypothesis 4. Hypothesis 5 has only partial support, as the 
PEAD is larger during the SAD season, but only in the case of the negative portfolio. 
Hypothesis 6 has only weak support, as the results show only very low statistical significance.  
Clearly, there are signs of a seasonal pattern. However, further multivariate analysis is needed 
before any conclusions can be made. Even if there seems to be a seasonal pattern, there is no 
evidence that SAD creates or affects this pattern. Because of this, as stated earlier, I control 
for cross-sectional differences and create a SAD variable to capture the SAD effect. If the 
SAD variable is found to be significant, there is a strong support for the SAD hypothesis, 
that is, SAD causes heightened risk aversion and affects the market reaction to profit 
warnings. 
Tables 6 and 7 show the regression results for immediate reaction to negative profit warnings. 
As expected, the SAD effect is not statistically significant. Dividing the SAD effect to fall 
and winter does not change the outcome. This finding can be explained by the ostrich effect 
suggested by Lin (2015). Table 6 and 7 show that the beta variable is statistically significant 
at 5% level and close being statistically significant at 1% level. This means that the riskier 
the firm is, the stronger the immediate response to the profit warning is. This finding is in 
line with the results of Spohr (2014). All other explanatory variables are statistically 
insignificant, which suggests that the size, MB ratio, analyst recommendations, EPS 
estimates or frequent warnings of a company, do not explain the immediate reaction to 
negative profit warnings. Size is statistically significant at 10% level, but this significance is 
very weak, and drops significantly after controlling for analyst recommendation. 
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Table 6. Regression tests of the SAD effect on immediate reaction to negative profit warnings. ***, ** and * 
represent statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
CAR (-1, +1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept -0,0531 -0,0509 -0,0500 -0,0601 -0,0665 -0,0596 -0,0622 
  -[8,07]*** [-3,05]*** [-2,97]*** [-3,52]*** [-3,47]*** [-3,03]*** [-3,02]*** 
SAD 0,0019 0,0002 0,0019 0,0020 0,0020 0,0020 0,0022 
  [0,99] [0,99] [0,99] [1,05] [1,04] [1,09] [1,15] 
Size   -0,0004 0,0000 0,0063 0,0058 0,0041 0,0040 
    [-0,13] [-0,02] [1,64]* [1,50] [1,00] [0,98] 
MB     -0,0014 -0,0020 -0,0018 -0,0030 -0,0031 
      [-0,46] [-0,67] [-0,60] [-0,98] [-1,00] 
Beta       -0,0362 -0,0351 -0,0339 -0,0337 
        [-2,42]** [-2,34]** [-2,25]** [-2,24]** 
Rec         0,0028 0,0032 0,0032 
          [0,70] [0,79] [0,79] 
EP           0,0006 0,0006 
            [1,46] [1,51] 
MultiW             0,0044 
              [0,43] 
                
R-Square 0,0055 0,0056 0,0067 0,0382 0,0408 0,0523 0,0534 
 
Table 7. Regression tests of SAD effects on immediate reaction to negative profit warnings. ***, ** and * represent 
statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
CAR (-1, +1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept -0,0527 -0,0508 -0,0499 -0,0607 -0,0672 -0,0602 -0,0631 
  -[8,05]*** [-3,03]*** [-2,95]*** [-3,52]*** [-3,47]*** [-3,02]*** [-3,02]*** 
SAD*Fall 0,0021 0,0021 0,0021 0,0023 0,0024 0,0024 0,0027 
  [0,92] [0,90] [0,89] [0,99] [1,04] [1,05] [1,12] 
SAD*Winter 0,0013 0,0013 0,0013 0,0015 0,0013 0,0015 0,0016 
  [0,52] [0,52] [0,53] [0,60] [0,52] [0,60] [0,65] 
Size   -0,0003 0,0000 0,0064 0,0059 0,0041 0,0041 
    [-0,12] [-0,01] [1,66]* [1,51] [1,02] [1,00] 
MB     -0,0014 -0,0020 -0,0017 -0,0030 -0,0031 
      [-0,46] [-0,66] [-0,59] [-0,97] [-0,99] 
Beta       -0,0364 -0,0353 -0,0341 -0,0340 
        [2,43]** [-2,34]** [-2,26]** [-2,25]** 
Rec         0,0030 0,0034 0,0034 
          [0,75] [0,83] [0,83] 
EP           0,0006 0,0006 
            [1,45] [1,51] 
MultiW             0,0047 
              [0,46] 
                
R-Square 0,0050 0,0051 0,0063 0,0382 0,0412 0,0526 0,0537 
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Tables 8 and 9 report the regression results for negative profit warnings using CAR(+2, +50) 
as the dependent variable to measure the PEAD. This time, the SAD variable is statistically 
significant at 10% level in every model and at 5% level in model 3. In other models, the 
corresponding p-values are close to 5%, ranging from 5,6% to 6%. As the coefficients are 
positive, this suggests that as the amount of daylight starts to increase after the winter solstice, 
SAD sufferers begin to heal, and this leads to a higher PEAD during the SAD season. As 
Table 9 shows, the winter variable is not statistically significant, but the fall variable is. This 
implies that the SAD effect is driven mainly by the fall. There is also some significance for 
the MB ratio, even though this significance drops from the 10% level after controlling for 
EPS estimates. Even though the statistical significance is low, there is some evidence that 
companies with high MB ratios have lower PEAD. The beta variable is not significant like it 
was in Tables 6 and 7, which implies that the risk of the company only affects the immediate 
reaction and not the PEAD. All other explanatory variables are statistically insignificant. 
Table 8. Regression tests of the SAD effect on post-earnings announcement drifts of negative 
profit warnings. ***, ** and * represent statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
CAR (+2, +50) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept -0,0386 -0,0537 -0,0473 -0,0361 -0,040 -0,03912 -0,0385 
  -[2,72]*** [-1,61] [-1,42] [-1,05] [-1,02] [-0,97] [-0,92] 
SAD 0,0077 0,0078 0,0051 0,00781 0,0079 0,0079 0,0078 
  [1,86]* [1,88]* [1,97]** [1,90]* [1,91]* [1,90]* [1,88]* 
Size   0,0027 0,0081 -0,0013 -0,0016 -0,0018 -0,0017 
    [0,50] [0,93] [-0,17] [-0,20] [-0,22] [-0,21] 
MB     -0,0102 -0,0096 -0,0095 -0,0097 -0,0096 
      [-1,77]* [-1,66]* [-1,63]* [-1,59] [-1,58] 
Beta       0,0365 0,0371 0,0372 0,0372 
        [1,23] [1,24] [1,24] [1,24] 
Rec         0,0017 0,0018 0,0017 
          [0,21] [0,22] [0,22] 
EP           0,0000 0,0000 
            [0,08] [0,07] 
MultiW             -0,0012 
              [-0,05] 
                
R-Square 0,0188 0,0202 0,0370 0,0451 0,0454 0,0454 0,0454 
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Table 9. Regression tests of SAD effects on post-earnings announcement drifts of negative 
profit warnings. ***, ** and * represent statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
CAR (+2, +50) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept -0,0368 -0,0518 -0,0454 -0,0342 -0,0369 -0,0356 -0,0360 
  -[2,73]*** [-1,58] [-1,38] [-1,01] [-0,96] [-0,90] [-0,87] 
SAD*Fall 0,0077 0,0078 0,0080 0,0078 0,0079 0,0079 0,0079 
  [1,86]* [1,88]* [1,94]* [1,90]* [1,90]* [1,89]* [1,87]* 
SAD*Winter 0,0075 0,0074 0,0082 0,0078 0,0077 0,0077 0,0078 
  [1,01] [1,01] [1,11] [1,06] [1,04] [1,04] [1,04] 
Size   0,0027 0,0051 -0,0014 -0,0016 -0,0019 -0,0019 
    [0,50] [0,93] [-0,19] [-0,21] [-0,24] [-0,24] 
MB     -0,0103 -0,0096 -0,0096 -0,0098 -0,0098 
      [-1,77]* [-1,66]* [-1,63]* [-1,60] [-1,59] 
Beta       0,0372 0,0377 0,0379 0,0379 
        [1,26] [1,26] [1,26] [1,26] 
Rec         0,0012 0,0013 0,00130 
          [0,15] [0,16] [0,16] 
EP           0,0000 0,0001 
            [0,12] [0,13] 
MultiW             0,0007 
              [0,03] 
                
R-Square 0,0199 0,0212 0,0380 0,0465 0,0466 0,0467 0,0467 
 
Tables 10 and 11 show the regression results for immediate reaction to positive profit 
warnings. Using SAD as the only explanatory variable in Table 10, the variable is significant 
at 10% level, but in models 2, 3, 4 and 5 the SAD variable becomes insignificant. However, 
in models 6 and 7 the SAD variable becomes significant again at 10% level. A closer 
investigation in Table 11 shows that the fall variable is significant in every model, being 
significant at 5% level in models 1, 6 and 7, and close being significant at 5% in other models. 
This implies that the SAD effect is driven by the fall, as the winter variable is not significant. 
As in Tables 6 and 7, size becomes significant at 10% level after adding the beta variable. 
However, size becomes insignificant when Rec is added. Other variables are insignificant. 
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Table 10. Regression tests of the SAD effect on immediate reaction to positive profit warnings. ***, ** and * 
represent statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
CAR (-1, +1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 0,0665 0,0907 0,0906 0,0992 0,0995 0,0929 0,0934 
  [8,67]*** [4,88]*** [4,85]*** [5,11]*** [5,06]*** [4,46]*** [4,41]*** 
SAD -0,0044 -0,0040 -0,0040 -0,0038 -0,0037 -0,0044 -0,0045 
  [-1,77]* [-1,59] [-1,59] [-1,51] [-1,50] [-1,70]* [-1,70]* 
Size   -0,0048 -0,0044 -0,0096 -0,0094 -0,0078 -0,0076 
    [-1,42] [-1,16] [1,88]* [-1,71]* [-1,36] [-1,29] 
MB     -0,0001 0,0005 0,0005 0,0017 0,0017 
      [-0,23] [0,11] [0,11] [0,38] [0,36] 
Beta       0,0315 0,0312 0,0327 0,0322 
        [1,51] [1,48] [1,55] [1,49] 
Rec         -0,0007 -0,0004 -0,0006 
          [-0,13] [-0,09] [-0,11] 
EP           -0,0006 -0,0006 
            [-0,95] [-0,95] 
MultiW             -0,0021 
              [-0,17] 
R-Square 0,0304 0,0498 0,0520 0,0722 0,0723 0,0813 0,0813 
 
Table 11. Regression tests of SAD effects on immediate reaction to positive profit warnings. ***, ** and * represent 
statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
CAR (-1, +1) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept 0,0663 0,0885 0,0884 0,0970 0,0975 0,0910 0,0911 
  [8,65]*** [4,72]*** [4,69]*** [4,97]*** [4,94]*** [4,35]*** [4,28]*** 
SAD*Fall -0,0064 -0,0057 -0,0057 -0,0056 -0,0056 -0,0062 -0,0063 
  [-2,12]** [-1,88]* [1,87]* [-1,84]* [-1,83]* [-1,99]** [-1,98]** 
SAD*Winter -0,0019 -0,0019 -0,0019 -0,0016 -0,0015 -0,0022 -0,0022 
  [-0,60] [-0,58] [-0,57] [-0,49] [-0,47] [-0,67] [-0,66] 
Size   -0,0044 -0,0040 -0,0093 -0,0088 -0,0073 -0,0072 
    [-1,29] [-1,04] [-1,81]* [-1,61] [-1,27] [-1,24] 
MB     -0,0001 0,0005 0,0005 0,0017 0,0017 
      [-0,23] [0,12] [0,11] [0,37] [0,37] 
Beta       0,0320 0,0315 0,0330 0,0329 
        [1,53] [1,50] [1,56] [1,53] 
Rec         -0,0011 -0,0009 -0,0009 
          [-0,22] [-0,18] [-0,18] 
EP           -0,0006 -0,0006 
            [-0,93] [0,36] 
MultiW             -0,0003 
              [-0,03] 
                
R-Square 0,0435 0,0596 0,0602 0,0827 0,0831 0,0915 0,0915 
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Tables 12 and 13 show the regression results of SAD effects on the PEAD of positive profit 
warnings. The SAD variable is not significant. Because the SAD variable is significant in the 
case of negative profit warnings in Table 8, this implies that the sign of the profit warning 
matters. Beta variable becomes significant at 5% level in the last model when MultiW 
variable is added. Interestingly, the MultiW is highly significant at 5% level, close being 
significant at 1% level. As the coefficient is negative, this suggests that investors’ response 
to positive profit warnings is smaller if a company has already announced several positive 
profit warnings. This is the only regression where MultiW is statistically significant. 
Furthermore, the result is also economically highly significant as the model suggests that the 
response could be even 5,22% smaller, if the company has announced several positive profit 
warnings in the past. Moreover, the reaction might be strengthened by the risk of the 
company. 
Results from Table 13 do not differ from Table 12. The MultiW variable has some interesting 
properties. As the variable is not significant in the case of the immediate reaction, this implies 
that around the profit warning day, the market does not take the past warnings into 
consideration. However, in the longer run, the market starts to adjust and reflect the past 
information. This suggests that the market may overreact to positive profit warnings of 
certain companies around the profit warning day. Interestingly, this is not the case with 
negative profit warnings.  
As Tables 12 and 13 show, SAD does not affect the PEAD of positive profit warnings. This 
finding is contrary to findings of Lin (2015), who reports that the effect of SAD does not 
depend on the direction of earnings surprises. My results suggest that the direction matters. 
Specifically, the SAD effect impacts the PEAD of negative profit warnings but not positive 
profit warnings.  
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Table 12. Regression tests of the SAD effect on post-earnings announcement drifts of positive profit warnings. ***, 
** and * represent statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
CAR (+2, +50) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept -0,0012 0,0194 0,0196 0,0029 0,0008 0,0059 0,0194 
  [-0,08] [0,57] [0,58] [0,08] [0,02] [0,16] [0,52] 
SAD -0,0011 -0,0005 -0,0004 -0,0013 -0,0014 -0,0008 -0,0009 
  [-0,24] [-0,10] [-0,09] [-0,25] [-0,27] [-0,16] [-0,19] 
Size   -0,0042 -0,0060 0,0044 0,0027 0,0014 0,0063 
    [-0,68] [-0,86] [0,47] [0,26] [0,13] [-0,60] 
MB     0,0044 0,0015 0,0016 0,0007 -0,0011 
      [0,57] [0,19] [0,21] [0,09] [-0,14] 
Beta       -0,0624 -0,0603 -0,0612 -0,0760 
        [-1,64] [-1,57] [-1,58] [-1,99]** 
Rec         0,0049 0,0047 0,0013 
          [0,53] [0,51] [0,15] 
EP           0,0004 0,0003 
            [0,39] [0,32] 
MultiW             -0,0547 
              [-2,44]** 
                
R-Square 0,0006 0,0051 0,0085 0,0351 0,0380 0,0395 0,0968 
 
Table 13. Regression tests of SAD effects on post-earnings announcement drifts of positive profit warnings. ***, ** 
and * represent statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
CAR (+2, +50) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Intercept -0,0088 0,0137 0,0139 -0,0016 -0,0030 0,0050 0,0183 
  -[-0,63] [0,40] [0,41] [-0,05] [-0,08] [0,13] [0,49] 
SAD*Fall -0,0002 0,0004 0,0005 -0,0003 -0,0003 0,0003 0,0005 
  [-0,05] [0,08] [0,10] [-0,07] [-0,06] [0,06] [0,10] 
SAD*Winter 0,0104 0,0108 0,0110 0,0096 0,0091 0,0103 0,0074 
  [1,13] [1,16] [1,17] [1,03] [0,96] [1,06] [0,77] 
Size   -0,0045 -0,0064 0,0035 0,0022 0,0003 0,0050 
    [-0,73] [-0,92] [0,37] [0,22] [0,03] [0,47] 
MB     0,0046 0,0018 0,0019 0,0005 -0,0012 
      [0,60] [0,23] [0,24] [0,06] [-0,15] 
Beta       -0,0588 -0,0573 -0,0587 -0,0731 
        [-1,54] [-1,49] [-1,51] [-1,90]* 
Rec         0,0035 0,0032 0,0004 
          [0,37] [0,34] [0,04] 
EP           0,0007 0,0005 
            [0,61] [0,51] 
MultiW             -0,0522 
              [-2,30]** 
                
R-Square 0,0138 0,0191 0,0227 0,0462 0,0476 0,0513 0,1025 
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I suggest that SAD does not have an effect on PEAD of positive profit warning because of 
the negativity bias. As bad information is processed more thoroughly than good information 
(see Baumeister et al. 2001), there is a possibility that responses to positive warnings are not 
revisited as carefully. As the negativity bias is connected with depression (see Dai et al. 
2016), the SAD effect might generate negativity bias among investors. This means that 
investors remember negative profit warnings better and let the increasing amount of daylight 
raise their optimism levels, which leads to a higher PEAD. However, investors do not revisit 
their thoughts about positive profit warnings because of the tendency to not remember 
positive information so well. As the response to positive information was already positive, 
even though smaller during the SAD season, the increasing amount of daylight does not make 
the “already positive information” more positive. After starting to recover from the 
depression caused by SAD, because of the negativity bias, investors focus more on the past 
negative information.  
The regression results support Hypothesis 4; SAD lowers the immediate market response to 
positive profit warnings but it does not have an effect on the immediate response to negative 
profit warnings. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 can be accepted. Hypothesis 5 has partial support, 
as the PEAD is higher during the SAD season in the case of negative profit warnings. 
However, the results suggest that SAD does not have an effect on the PEAD of positive profit 
warnings. I suggest that the negativity bias could be one explanation for this. This means that 
Hypothesis 5 can be accepted in the case of negative profit warnings but not in the case of 
positive ones. There is not enough evidence to accept Hypothesis 6. My results suggest that 
the SAD effect is mainly driven by the fall. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
A listed company must publish a profit warning if its profit or financial position differs 
substantially from the expected profit or financial position of the company. This ensures that 
investors are aware of all relevant information about the company and can make rational 
investment decisions. (Karjalainen et al. 2008: 153–154.)  
Seasonal affective disorder (SAD) is a medical condition that is characterized by a depressed 
mood during times when the amount of daylight is low (Molin et al. (1996). SAD causes 
heightened risk aversion among investors which means that investors bend more towards 
choices that involve less risk. 
Using daily data from the Finnish stock market in 2011–2017, I study the market reaction to 
positive and negative profit warnings. Additionally, as the main interest of this study, I 
examine how SAD affects investors’ response to profit warnings. 
Both negative and positive profit warnings generate significant abnormal returns on the 
announcement day. Abnormal returns are observed even two days after the negative profit 
warning. However, the same is not observed in the case of positive profit warnings. This 
implies that the market has difficulties to adjust accordingly to negative information. 
Examination of CAAR(+1, +5) of negative profit warnings reveals that this period is 
statistically highly significant. 
There have been controversial results about the effect of size and MB ratio of a company to 
profit warnings (see Jackson et al. 2003; Bulkey et al. 2005; Jackson et al. 2007; Hirshleifer 
et al. 2009; Church et al. 2010). My results suggest that size nor MB ratio affect investors’ 
response to profit warnings. Size and MB ratio are statistically significant at 10% in some 
regression models, but when more variables are added, they lose their significance. 
Moreover, the regression results show that in the case of negative profit warnings, the riskier 
the firm is, the bigger the immediate reaction to the profit warnings is. The same is not 
observed in the case of positive profit warnings, which suggest that the risk of the company 
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does not matter how investors react to positive profit warnings. Furthermore, analyst 
recommendations show no statistically significant results. 
PEAD of profit warnings show no statistical significance for the control variables, expect the 
MultiW variable that has a negative coefficient and is statistically highly significant in the 
case of positive profit warnings. This implies that if a company has already announced 
several positive profit warnings, the market response to the next profit warning is smaller. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of this effects seems to be connected to the risk of the company. 
However, as MultiW is not significant in the case of negative profit warnings, this suggests 
that the market does not care if the company has already announced several negative profit 
warnings. The response is not more negative as one could expect. As several prior studies 
focus only on negative profit warnings, my results suggest that investors might respond 
differently to negative and positive profit warnings. 
As the main interest of this study, I find that SAD affects the immediate response to positive 
profit warnings but not negative profit warnings. The immediate response to positive 
warnings is lower during the SAD season. This is explained by the heightened risk aversion 
caused by SAD. However, because of the ostrich effect, suggested by Lin (2015), SAD does 
not affect the immediate response to negative profit warnings. Investors tend to pretend that 
the negative information does not exist. I also find that SAD affects the PEAD of negative 
profit warnings but not the PEAD of positive profit warnings. Because of the amount of 
daylight starts to increase after the winter solstice, investors start to recover from SAD 
symptoms. This means that the PEAD is higher during the SAD season than during the non-
SAD season. However, the results suggest that this is true only in the case of negative profit 
warnings, as the SAD variable in the regressions is statistically insignificant in the case of 
PEAD of positive profit warnings. 
I suggest that because of the negativity bias, investors revisit their thoughts about negative 
profit warnings and tend to ignore positive profit warnings in the past. When the amount of 
daylight is low, SAD sufferers feel depressed, and they tend to ignore negative news. 
However, when the amount of daylight starts to increase, investors start to recover from SAD 
symptoms. As investors start to gain their confidence and optimism levels back, they are 
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more willing to revisit their thoughts about negative profit warnings. However, they do not 
revisit their thoughts about positive profit warnings because of the negativity bias; they tend 
to remember the negative information better. This could be a reason why the PEAD of 
negative profit warnings is explained by the SAD variable and why the PEAD of positive 
profit warnings is not. Naturally, this is just an assumption and one possible suggestion to 
this asymmetry. A further empirical analysis should be conducted to have substantial support 
for such assumption.  
The findings of this study suggest that the sign of the profit warnings matters how investors 
will react to the information. Specifically, SAD affects the immediate reaction to positive 
profit warnings but not the immediate reaction to negative profit warnings. Moreover, SAD 
affects the PEAD of negative profit warnings but not the PEAD of positive profit warnings. 
However, the results suggest that most, if not all, of the SAD effect is prevalent in the fall. 
After dividing the SAD effect to the fall and winter, the results suggest that the SAD effect 
is mainly driven by the fall. Furthermore, I do not find statistically significant asymmetric 
effect in SAD, i.e. that PEAD is higher in the winter. However, in the case of positive profit 
warnings, the difference of returns in the sample is almost 5% but is still not statistically 
significant. Nonetheless, the economic significant is high and the statistical insignificancy 
may be due to the small sample size. 
To best of my knowledge, this is the first research to link SAD to profit warnings. The results 
of this study suggest that SAD affects the financial market in Finland. The results of this 
study can be used by professional investors who try to benefit from temporary market 
mispricing. However, this study calls for a further investigation of this topic. Specifically, 
increasing the sample size from outside of Finland could provide more robust results. 
Additionally, further research about the ostrich effect and negativity bias related to the SAD 
is needed to fully understand the possible implications between these phenomena.  
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APPENDIX  
 
Appendix 1. List of the profit warnings used in the thesis. 
12/01/2011 Stockmann PLC  12/10/2011 YIT PLC 
14/01/2011 Lassila & Tikanoja PLC  18/10/2011 Ahlstrom PLC 
14/01/2011 Componenta PLC  19/10/2011 Sampo PLC 
21/01/2011 Suominen Group PLC  20/10/2011 Viking Line PLC 
01/02/2011 Vaisala PLC  18/11/2011 Kemira PLC 
01/02/2011 Marimekko PLC  25/11/2011 Turkistuottajat PLC 
02/03/2011 Digia PLC  08/12/2011 Metsäliitto Group 
14/03/2011 Vacon PLC  08/12/2011 Aspo PLC 
24/03/2011 Finnair PLC  15/12/2011 Pohjola Pankki PLC 
24/03/2011 Turkistuottajat PLC  20/12/2011 Raisio PLC 
31/03/2011 Orion PLC  21/12/2011 Sievi Capital PLC 
04/04/2011 Nokian Tyres PLC  22/12/2011 Tulikivi PLC 
06/04/2011 Finnlines PLC  11/01/2012 Teleste PLC 
12/04/2011 Okmetic PLC  18/01/2012 Viking Line PLC 
20/04/2011 Stockmann PLC  23/01/2012 Finnlines PLC 
20/04/2011 Metso PLC  26/01/2012 Ålandsbanken  
17/05/2011 Efore PLC  27/01/2012 Martela PLC 
31/05/2011 Elcoteq PLC  07/02/2012 Uponor PLC 
31/05/2011 Nokia PLC  24/02/2012 Aspo PLC 
13/06/2011 Atria PLC  20/03/2012 Lännen Tehtaat PLC 
13/06/2011 Oral Hammaslääkärit PLC  23/03/2012 Tectia PLC 
15/07/2011 Wulff-Group PLC  11/04/2012 Nokia PLC 
18/07/2011 Ahlstrom PLC  12/04/2012 Nurminen Logistics PLC 
19/07/2011 Oriola PLC  12/06/2012 Cargotec PLC 
26/07/2011 HKScan PLC  13/06/2012 Saga Furs PLC 
04/08/2011 Ahlstrom PLC  19/06/2012 Incap PLC 
05/08/2011 Tiimari PLC  29/06/2012 Pöyry PLC 
13/09/2011 Sievi Capital PLC  10/07/2012 Outokumpu PLC 
14/09/2011 Aspocomp PLC  17/07/2012 Wulff-Group PLC 
19/09/2011 Panostaja PLC  07/08/2012 Honkarakenne PLC 
20/09/2011 Incap PLC  10/08/2012 Aspo PLC 
21/09/2011 Neste Oil PLC  07/09/2012 Componenta PLC 
27/09/2011 Uponor PLC  11/09/2012 Tikkurila PLC 
07/10/2011 Rautaruukki PLC  25/09/2012 Nurminen Logistics PLC 
07/10/2011 Finnair PLC  27/09/2012 Rautaruukki PLC 
10/10/2011 Konecranes PLC  15/10/2012 Aktia PLC 
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16/10/2012 Ahlstrom PLC  05/08/2013 Tulikivi PLC 
31/10/2012 Yleiselektroniikka PLC  19/08/2013 Keskisuomalainen 
07/11/2012 Ruukki Group PLC  10/09/2013 Neste Oil PLC 
27/11/2012 Ahlstrom PLC  11/09/2013 YIT PLC 
28/11/2012 Saga Furs PLC  11/09/2013 Kone PLC 
31/10/2012 Yleiselektroniikka PLC  12/09/2013 Scanfil PLC 
07/11/2012 Ruukki Group PLC  20/09/2013 Nurminen Logistics 
27/11/2012 Ahlstrom PLC  24/09/2013 Wulff-Group PLC 
28/11/2012 Saga Furs PLC  25/09/2013 HKScan PLC 
05/12/2012 Suominen PLC  01/10/2013 Etteplan PLC 
12/12/2012 Marimekko PLC  04/10/2013 Nokian Tyres PLC 
14/12/2012 Wulff-Group PLC  09/10/2013 Stora Enso PLC 
18/12/2012 Incap PLC  10/10/2013 Vaisala PLC 
04/01/2013 Honkarakenne PLC  14/10/2013 Konecranes PLC 
09/01/2013 Stockmann PLC  17/10/2013 Outotec PLC 
10/01/2013 Elektrobit PLC  17/10/2013 Metso PLC 
10/01/2013 Nokia PLC  21/10/2013 Atria PLC 
11/01/2013 Vaisala PLC  24/10/2013 Finnari PLC 
21/01/2013 Ålandsbanken   28/10/2013 Saga Furs PLC 
23/01/2013 Martela PLC  13/11/2013 Finnari PLC 
31/01/2013 Suominen PLC  28/11/2013 Lemminkäinen PLC 
06/02/2013 Exel Composites PLC  19/12/2013 Martela PLC 
11/02/2013 Componenta PLC  19/12/2013 Metso PLC 
13/03/2013 Citycon PLC  22/12/2013 Saga Furs PLC 
15/03/2013 Technopolis PLC  09/01/2014 Caverion PLC 
22/03/2013 Sanoma PLC  09/01/2014 Stockmann PLC 
15/04/2013 Biohit PLC  17/01/2014 Ramirent PLC 
16/04/2013 Stockmann PLC  21/01/2014 Uponor PLC 
18/04/2013 Ilkka-Yhtymä PLC  21/01/2014 Kemira PLC 
19/04/2013 Lemminkäinen PLC  23/01/2014 Vacon PLC 
29/05/2013 PKC Group PLC  28/01/2014 Ilkka-Yhtymä PLC 
04/06/2013 YIT PLC  10/02/2014 Suominen PLC 
13/06/2013 Saga Furs PLC  10/02/2014 Componenta PLC 
17/06/2013 Wulff-Group PLC  11/02/2014 Incap PLC 
25/06/2013 YIT PLC  05/03/2014 Restamax PLC 
23/07/2013 Sanoma PLC  14/04/2014 Atria PLC 
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14/04/2014 Oral Hammaslääkärit PLC  18/03/2015 Apetit PLC 
15/04/2014 Alma Media PLC  14/04/2015 Stora Enso PLC 
06/05/2014 Ilkka-Yhtymä PLC  14/04/2015 Okmetic PLC 
02/06/2014 Finnair PLC  21/04/2015 Neste Oil PLC 
03/06/2014 Fiskars PLC  23/04/2015 Outokumpu PLC 
12/06/2014 Stockmann PLC  24/04/2015 Orion PLC 
16/06/2014 HKScan PLC  08/06/2015 QPR Software PLC 
08/07/2014 Citycon PLC  12/06/2015 Technopolis PLC 
10/07/2014 Ålandsbanken   17/06/2015 Alma Media PLC 
15/07/2014 Oriola PLC  01/07/2015 PKC Group PLC 
28/07/2014 Outotec PLC  16/07/2015 Sanoma PLC 
30/07/2014 Martela PLC  27/07/2015 Fiskars PLC 
01/08/2014 Lassila & Tikanoja PLC  03/08/2015 Yleiselektroniikka  
04/08/2014 Aspo PLC  17/08/2015 Investors House PLC 
29/08/2014 Neste Oil PLC  18/08/2015 Konecranes PLC 
12/09/2014 Vacon PLC  31/08/2015 Etteplan PLC 
15/09/2014 Scanfil PLC  22/09/2015 Outokumpu PLC 
02/10/2014 Apetit PLC  12/10/2015 Stora Enso PLC 
07/10/2014 Honkarakenne PLC  19/10/2015 Componenta PLC 
09/10/2014 Yleiselektroniikka PLC  21/10/2015 Vaisala PLC 
10/10/2014 Oriola PLC  23/11/2015 Destia Group PLC 
14/10/2014 Stockmann PLC  05/01/2016 Aspocomp Group 
17/10/2014 Aspo PLC  18/01/2016 Alma Media PLC 
21/10/2014 Marimekko PLC  19/01/2016 Stora Enso PLC 
24/10/2014 Restamax PLC  26/01/2016 Uponor PLC 
13/11/2014 Atria PLC  08/02/2016 Elecster PLC 
20/11/2014 Aspo PLC  29/02/2016 Sponda PLC 
03/12/2014 Leipurin PLC  15/03/2016 Etteplan PLC 
08/12/2014 Oriola PLC  18/03/2016 Investors House PLC 
16/12/2014 Ramirent PLC  01/04/2016 Okmetic PLC 
17/12/2014 Martela PLC  12/04/2016 Asiakastieto Group 
20/12/2014 Neste Oil PLC  22/04/2016 Caverion PLC 
08/01/2015 Olvi PLC  25/04/2016 Digia PLC 
19/01/2015 Stora Enso PLC  27/04/2016 Caverion PLC 
26/01/2015 YIT PLC  02/05/2016 Honkarakenne PLC 
10/02/2015 Affecto PLC  09/06/2016 Martela PLC 
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20/06/2016 Caverion PLC  21/06/2017 Asiakastieto Group  
20/06/2016 Ilkka-Yhtymä PLC  12/07/2017 HKScan PLC 
15/07/2016 Comptel PLC  13/07/2017 Oriola PLC 
20/07/2016 Okmetic PLC  13/07/2017 Outokumpu PLC 
02/08/2016 Valoe PLC  13/07/2017 Alma Media PLC 
14/09/2016 Alma Media PLC  14/07/2017 Teleste PLC 
20/09/2016 Suominen PLC  18/07/2017 Konecranes PLC 
30/09/2016 Keskisuomalainen PLC  20/07/2017 SRV Group PLC 
19/10/2016 Caverion PLC  20/07/2017 Suominen PLC 
19/10/2016 Apetit PLC  21/07/2017 Raisio PLC 
19/10/2016 Basware PLC  25/07/2017 Outotec PLC 
20/10/2016 Lemminkäinen PLC  27/07/2017 Raute PLC 
21/10/2016 HKScan PLC  07/08/2017 Investors House PLC 
26/10/2016 Consti Group PLC  29/08/2017 Aktia Pankki PLC 
09/11/2016 Lemminkäinen PLC  06/09/2017 Exel Composites PLC 
11/11/2016 Lehto Group PLC  07/09/2017 Sanoma PLC 
24/11/2016 Aspo PLC  12/09/2017 Lemminkäinen PLC 
14/12/2016 Tikkurila PLC  15/09/2017 Consti Group PLC 
21/12/2016 Incap PLC  20/09/2017 Wulff-Group PLC 
13/01/2017 HKScan PLC  26/09/2017 Kone PLC 
16/01/2017 Caverion PLC  26/09/2017 Stockmann PLC 
18/01/2017 Scanfil PLC  11/10/2017 Taaleri PLC 
19/01/2017 Stora Enso PLC  13/10/2017 QPR Software PLC 
20/01/2017 Rapala VMC PLC  13/10/2017 DNA PLC 
03/02/2017 Orava Asuntorahasto PLC  13/10/2017 Honkarakenne PLC 
03/02/2017 Lehto Group PLC  25/10/2017 Asiakastieto Group 
10/02/2017 Honkarakenne PLC  31/10/2017 HKScan PLC 
24/03/2017 Valoe PLC  01/11/2017 Elecster PLC 
12/04/2017 Valmet PLC  16/11/2017 Lassila & Tikanoja 
08/05/2017 Affecto PLC  30/11/2017 Silmäasema PLC 
18/05/2017 Keskisuomalainen PLC  12/12/2017 Caverion PLC 
24/05/2017 Lehto Group PLC  12/12/2017 Scanfil PLC 
29/05/2017 Investors House PLC  13/12/2017 Metsä Group PLC 
13/06/2017 Lassila & Tikanoja PLC  15/12/2017 Consti Yhtiöt PLC 
15/06/2017 Pöyry PLC  18/12/2017 Oriola PLC 
20/06/2017 Ilkka-Yhtymä PLC  18/12/2017 Robit PLC 
20/06/2017 Taaleri PLC  22/12/2017 Lehto Group PLC 
 
